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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING BELOW
This matter comes directly to the Court on a "petition
for review" filed by the National Parks and Conservation
Association ("NPCA"), under Rule 14 of the Rules
of the Utah Supreme Court.

NPCA seeks review of informal

administrative actions by the Division of State Lands and
Forestry ("Division") in connection with an exchange of a
section of state school trust lands with Garfield County.
NPCA asserts jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(3)(e)(iii). Respondents oppose this assertion of
original jurisdiction.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES1
The issues presented for review are as follows:
1. Whether this Court has initial, original
jurisdiction over the Board and Division pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(e)(iii).
2.

Whether NPCA lacks standing.

3. Whether the exchange of school lands was consistent
with the terms and duties of the land grant trust.
4. Whether the exchange was consistent with applicable
statutes, rules and policies.
5. Whether the Division's approval of this exchange
was a proper exercise of agency power and met any applicable
procedural requirements.
6. Whether the Division properly responded to NPCA's
requests for intervention, to delay action and for declaratory
rulings.
7.

Whether the Board exceeded its statutory role.

In accord with R. Utah S.Ct. 24(b), Respondents include their
own statement of issues because they are dissatisfied with NPCA's
statement.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter concerns an exchange between the Division
of State Lands and Forestry ("Division" or "Director") and
Garfield County of a section of state school trust lands, and
Division responses to requests from NPCA styled as a "petition
for intervention or to otherwise participate", a request for
declaratory rulings and a request to defer action.
A.

THE GARFIELD COUNTY EXCHANGE
1.

The School Trust Land Section

On April 23, 1987, Garfield County made application to
the Division for the exchange of State land pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated, Section 65-1-70 (1973, repealed and reenacted 1987 as
Section 65A-7-7, effective July 1, 1988).
(R. 5)
Garfield County proposed in the application the
exchange of school trust land described as Section 16, T. 34 S.,
R. 8 E., located in Garfield County and within the exterior
boundaries of Capitol Reef National Park (referred to
as "the Switchbacks Section" due to its primary physical
feature).

(R.7-9)

The Switchbacks Section is one of almost

NPCA's Statement of the Case, and its entire brief, is riddled
with assertions of fact that are one-sided, take quotes out of
context, argumentative and unsupported by reference to documents
in the record. Improper and inadequately referenced factual
assertions are normally disregarded and have been held by this
Court to be grounds for affirmation. Golden Key Realty, Inc. v.
Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 734 (Utah 1985)(assertions must be cited to
record; blanket citations prohibited); Hobbs v. Denver and Rio
Grande Western R.R., 677 P. 2d 1128 (Utah 1984)(failure to
evenhandedly cite record resulted in affirmation).

thirty school sections acquired prior to the creation of Capitol
Reef National Park and treated as a valid existing right in the
Capitol Reef Enabling Act.

16 U.S.C.A. S 273a (1974).3

Contrary to NPCA's assertions on pages 9 and 10 of
its "Statement of the Facts", the Switchbacks Section is not
involved in a wilderness designation.

More importantly, the

1974 "Wilderness Recommendation", quoted by NPCA as describing
the Switchbacks Section in particular, is over a decade out of
4
date.
The new July 1987 "Statement for Management" for Capitol
Reef classifies the school section as a "private development
subzone" and states that: "the NPS can exercise little formal
control over these lands" and that "the State is also limited in
its ability to manage these school sections."
Service

The National Park

also plans to develop this portion of the park involving

the section.

16 U.S.C. S 273a provides in part: "lands or
interests therein owned by the State of Utah, or any political
subdivision thereof, may be acquired only with the approval of
such State or political subdivision."
4
The 1974 Wilderness Recommendation was attached as
an appendix to NPCA's "Motion to Supplement Administrative
Record" that was filed with their brief. The motion was denied.
Statement for Management, Capitol Reef National
Park, July 1987, pages 28, 49 and attached map attached as
Appendix B to Addendum for this brief. Also in Appendix B is the
Final Environmental Impact Statement, "Statement of Findings" for
Capitol Reef National Park's General Management Plan. In the
Plan's Summary, pages iii and iv, the Plan outlines the general
development planned for the South District, which covers the
Switchbacks Section, to include "a ranger station, a campground,
utility and employee housing areas and a new road", with only
"minor effects on the socioeconomic environment".
-3-

2.

Initial Agency Actions
a.

RDCC Planning and Environmental Review

The proposed exchange was initially processed and
submitted to the State Planning Coordinator and the Areawide
Clearinghouse on a notice of State action dated July 8, 1987 with
comments due August 17, 1987.
Through the Resource Development and Coordinating
Committee process, comments are received from the 16 state
agencies and the public on state actions affecting the state's
environment or physical resources.
7 (1981);

Utah Code Ann. § 63--28a-l to

Utah Admin. Rule R675-1-3-H (1987).
b.

RDCC Comments

The Five-County Association of Governments provided
comments on the proposed exchange on August 13, 1987.

Other

comments arising from the RDCC process were received from state
and federal agencies and members of the public on August 21,
1987, in a letter from the State Planning Coordinator to the
Division.

(R. 35 and 48)

Division written analysis.

These comments were discussed in a
(R. 25-26, 38, 48-50)

Comments from NPCA were provided by letter to the
Director dated September 7f 1987.
3.

(R. 39-41)

The September Board Meeting

On September 4f 1987, the agenda for the upcoming
meeting of the Board of State Lands and Forestry was circulated
to anyone on a standing mailing list and also provided in a news
release to all newspapers and media of general circulation

-4-

pursuant to the Utah Open Meetings Act.
The meeting of the Board of State Lands and Forestry
was convened on September 11, 1987.

(R. 42) At that meeting,

the Division presented a revised analysis of the exchange
proposal, which was based on an earlier, July 27, 1987 working
draft.

(R. 31-36, 43-49)

The Division written analysis

included: (1) an analysis of the appraisals (R. 31, 44); (2) an
economic potential comparison (R. 32, 44); (3) a "hold/sale"
analysis (R. 32, 45); (4) an analysis of the exchange in terms of
trust duties (R. 33-34, 45-47); (5) review of the Bangerter/Hodel
o

MOU

and other potential transactions (R. 34, 47-48); (6) a

discussion of RDCC comments, including those of NPCA (R. 48, 50);
a summary of the notification process (R. 36,); and an analysis
9
of the policy implications of an exchange (R. 36).
u

Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-6(3)(a) (1977, amended 1978)
only provides that: "public notice shall be satisfied by: (a)
Posting written notice.... and (b) Providing notice to at least
one newspaper of general circulation within the geographical
jurisdiction of the public body, or to a local media
correspondent."
7
Although the Division memorandum in the
administrative record is erroneously dated July 27, 1987 from an
earlier draft, it was not prepared in final form until the Board
meeting. As the analysis is also reported in full in the Board
minutes (attached), both record references have been provided.
o

The Division Director reported at the Board meeting
that Governor Bangerter had contacted Secretary of the Interior
Hodel and that Hodel "saw no policy conflict with this proposal".
(R. 49)
o
NPCA quotes this Division policy analysis as support
for the assertion in its Brief at page 13 that the Division
"repeatedly acknowledged conflict with prior policy". This is
another example of NPCA's taking a quote out of context. The
paragraph concludes: "This recommended action is consistent with
that policy".
-5-

The Board and Division also heard comments from various
interested parties and discussed alternatives suggested by the
Division and public comment, including comment from Terri Martin
on behalf of NPCA.

(R. 52-53)

Ms. Martin submitted a six-page

letter and summarized six concerns, including (1) harm to the
Park's scenic and natural values, (2) adverse impact on the MOU,
(3) appraisal problems, (4) Board authority and policy and (5)
adequacy of notice.

(R. 52-53)

The Director noted that the Division was faced with the
basic question of whether the exchange application offered by
Garfield County was consistent with trust obligations in the best
interest of the school trust beneficiaries—not Garfield County
or park visitors.

(R. 49)

Individual Board members asked

questions of various persons making statements at the Board
Meeting and made statements of their individual perspectives and
concerns.

(R. 49-54)
After discussing five alternatives, including deferring

action, the Director recommended that the Board move to approve
the "concept of an exchange subject to further evaluation to
assure there is a benefit to be realized from the County
exchange".

(R. 48 and 49) After the discussion of these items,

the Board approved the Division's recommendation.
1.

(R. 54)

Division's Administrative Actions on the Exchange

The Division Staff reviewed appraisals for each of the
two parcels of land initially offered by Garfield County and
concluded that the appraisals reflected the value of the land.

-6-

(R. 59-60 and R. 72.)

The Division reviewed the likelihood of

economic benefit from the exchange (R. 59-60) and the rules
governing trust land management in order to be "fully aware of
the alternatives and for managing trust lands and the
consequences of those alternatives."

(R. 5|8)

After these analyses, the Division concluded that the
lands offered by Garfield County were insufficient to satisfy
Division trust management objectives and sb informed Garfield
County.

(R. 73)

The Division advised Garfield County that the

County had the alternative of offering additional land value and
that the Division was in the process of considering issues raised
in NPCA's request for declaratory rulings.

(R. 72-73)

The Division Director sent a December 2, 1987 status
report to the Board wherein he concluded that the Board's
"conceptual" approval reflects the Board's judgment that an
economically advantageous exchange is "consistent with sound
policy", and that in light of the Board's role would not be
involved in "administrative or executive functions such as the
execution of an exchange".

(R. 92-93)

After the Division's November 3# 1987 letter to
Garfield County, Garfield County offered additional land as
requested, that amounted to over 150% of ^he value of the
Switchbacks Section

.

(R. 89)

Division Staff reviewed the

The value of the Switchbacks Section was appraised at $65,000
and the Garfield County property was appraised at $98,000. The
Division recognized that any exchange with the federal government
is restricted to equal value by the Federal Land Policy
Management Act. (R. 47)

-7-

appraisal of the offered land and concluded that it met generally
accepted appraisal standards.
exchange on December 21, 1987.

(R. 89)

The Director approved the

(R. 89)

A press release announcing the approval of the exchange
was issued, accompanied by a three-page, single-spaced "Statement
on the Exchange of Land".

(R. 94-97)

This Statement describes

the Director's rationale for his decision and contains his
findings and conclusions.

The patent for the Switchbacks Section

was signed by the Governor on December 24, 1987.
B.

DIVISION RESPONSES TO THE NPCA REQUESTS

1.

Division Response to NPCA's Request to
"Intervene or Otherwise Participate"

On October 14, 1987, NPCA sent a letter requesting "the
right to intervene or otherwise participate" in the exchange
process.

(R. 61)

On November 16, 1987, in reply to NPCA's

request, the Division advised NPCA that it had "no procedures
under which a request for intervention in the consideration of
an exchange proposal might be granted" and an exchange was not
"viewed as an adjudicative action under current law."
75)

(R. 74,

The Division also concluded that there was "no basis for

interjection of a third party into such a negotiation process."
(R. 74, 75)
While the Division did not formally grant intervention,
NPCA was notified that the Division would "welcome any
information related to the value of affected properties or any
alternative which you may have to offer".

-ft-

(R. 74, 75)

NPCA was

"urged to provide such information as soon as possible".
(R. 74, 75)
NPCA sent the Division a letter dated December 18,
1987 that reiterated their prior legal arguments and requested
that they be "provided responses to the declaratory rulings, with
reasonable opportunity thereafter to proffer factual submissions
or legal argument in opposition to the exchange."

(R. 77)

This letter was not received by the Division until three days
after the exchange had been approved.
2.

(R. 91)

Petition for Declaratory Rulings

Also on October 14, 1987, NPCA sent a letter to the
Division which requested that the Board or the Director render
nine declaratory rulings.

(R. 65 and R. 71)

On December 21,

1987, the Director responded to the request for declaratory
rulings, in accordance with the requirements of Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46A-15 and R632-7-1.

The Director advised NPCA that the

declaratory ruling statute and implementing rules contemplated
an adjudicative process, and that pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46a-3(8)(a), declaratory ruling requests could not be used
to "inhibit agency discretion".

(R. 83) .

The Director further advised NPCA that declaratory
rulings could not be used as an alternative to rulemaking or for
general applicability.

(R. 83) He further advised NPCA that

they had provided inadequate information under the terms of
The December 18, 1987 letter sets forth almost identical,
purely legal arguments as in earlier submittals. (R. 39-41, 5253, 66-71)

Division Rule R632-7 to enable a ruling on six of the requests,
but "would be pleased to entertain any additional requests which
provide adequate information" or "respond in a non-adjudicative
setting to any questions."

(R. 84)

The Director found that the

8th and 9th requests provided by NPCA did not identify "statutes,
rules, or orders as required by statute and rules."

Further, the

Director advised NPCA of the apparent mischaracterization by NPCA
of certain Division documents as current authoritative statements
of policy.

(R. 84)

The Director did issue a ruling on the applicability of
Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-14, pertaining to NPCA's 7th request, i.e.,
whether the Division can give "preference to the protection of
significant scenic, aesthetic and recreational values where such
decisions may foreclose or reduce prospects for greater monetary
returns from a different decision."

(R. 71, 84)

The Director

summarized his ruling as follows:
In summary, the State has a duty as trustee
to manage and dispose of lands for the
benefit of the public school system. To
the extent that preservation of noneconomic values does not constitute a
diversion of trust assets or resources,
such an activity may be prudently
undertaken. To the extent that there exist
several options for dealing with trust
property and the protection of non-economic
values is necessary for maximizing the
economic value of the property, such
protection may be prudently undertaken.
When such preservation or protection
results in a diversion of assets or loss of
economic opportunity, a breach of duty is
indicated. The provisions of Section 65-114 must be read accordingly.
(R. 87)

The Director observed to NPCA that the ruling would be

of limited scope due to the level of information provided by the
request.

(R. 84 and R. 85.) NPCA did not provide any additional

information or make any other inquiry concerning the rulings.
NPCA filed its "Petition for Review" with this Court on
January 28, 1988.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The NPCA "Petition for Review" and Brief places before
the Court issues requiring construction of the Utah Enabling Act,
the Utah Constitution and a variety of statutes and rules, most
of which involve the administration of state lands. Unless the
issue before the Court involves a "pure question of law", where
an agency has been granted broad discretion and agency expertise
is involved, this Court grants deference to the agency's
interpretation and application.

Adkins v. Division of State

Lands, 719 P.2d 524# 526 (Utah 1986); citing Salt Lake City Corp.
v. Department of Employment Security/ 657 P.2d 1321 (Utah 1982).
In particular, matters involving the disposition of
school trust lands have been accorded special treatment on
review.

Numerous state court decisions and several United States

Supreme Court decisions have reviewed trust land transactions
with special deference in view of the trust.

See, e.g., Alamo

Land and Cattle Co. v. Arizonay 424 U.S. 295 (1976);

Duchesne

County v. State Tax Comm'n., 104 Utah 365, 140 P.2d 335 (1943);
Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995 (CD. Utah 1979);

Kadish v.

Arizona State Land Dept., 155 Ariz. 484, 747 P.2d 1183 (1987).
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In cases of construction of the law for trust lands,
the Arizona Supreme Court found that "in dealing with trust lands
in particular, all doubts must be resolved in favor of protecting
and preserving trust purposes".

155 Ariz, at 494, 747 P.2d at

1194.
Since the Board and Division of State Lands and
Forestry administer millions of acres of surface and minerals in
trust for specified beneficiaries, they have been granted broad
discretion with regard to the negotiation and execution of
property transactions.
P. 534 (1900);
(1915);

See e.g., Miles v. Wells, 22 Utah 55, 61

Whitmore v. Candland, 47 Utah 77, 151 P. 528

Hamblin v. State Board of Land Commissioners, 55 Utah

402, 187 P. 178 (1919);

McKnight v. State Land Board, 14 Utah 2d

238, 381 P.2d 786 (1963);

Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 26

Utah 2d 100, 485 P.2d 1035 (1971).

Due to this broad grant of

management discretion, it has been held that:
The whole matter of making disposition
of the state's lands was placed in the
hands and under the control of the state
land board. No right of appeal to the
courts, or of reviewing the board's
actions otherwise by the courts, except
where lack or excess of power is
alleged, has been given. All the courts
can do, therefore, is to inquire into
and determine in a proper proceeding
whether the board has acted without or
in excess of its powers or jurisdiction.
Courts may not review the conduct of the
board, for the purpose of correcting
mere irregularities.
Whitmore v. Candland, 47 Utah 77, 88, 151 P. 528, 535 (1915);
quoted by, McKnight v. State Land Board, 14 Utah 2d 238, 245, 381
i o_

P.2d 726, 730 (1963)•

After Adkins, it is apparent that the

Court's recognition of a grant of Board discretion would apply
equally to the Division.

Adkins at 527.

When the law governing the trust is construed and
applied to a question of land disposition, the law must be
harmonized with carrying out the responsibility of administering
trust lands "in the most prudent and profitable manner possible".
Coleman v. Utah State Land Board, 17 Utah 2d 14, 18, 403 P.2d
781, 785 (1965)(emphasis added).
In sum, the broad grant of authority to the Board and
Division, the agency's special expertise as trustee, and the
mandate of the trust act together to curb review of this matter.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS]
1.

The Court lacks jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-2-2 (3)(e)(iii) over the Division and Board because § 78-2-2
(3)(e)(iii) makes no reference to the Division and only refers to
"appellate" jurisdiction over Board "final orders" in a "formal
adjudicative proceeding".

There was no "formal adjudicative

proceeding" by the Board or Division, no Board final order, and
no authority for the Board to adjudicate and render a final
order.
2.

NPCA lacks standing under this Court's standards

set forth in Terracor, and in particular has failed to properly
allege particularized injury arising from protected interests in
the state section.

NPCA's allegations are speculative,

hypothetical and merely a generalized attack on government.
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Other parties have a greater interest in this matter, such as the
federal government and trust beneficiaries, and no issues of
great public import flow from this exchange.
3.

The terms and duties of the trust, as established

in the Utah Enabling Act and Utah Constitution, require that both
federal and state governments administer the trust, using
standard trust law principles, to provide the greatest possible
benefit for the school land grant trust, and not as public or
national park lands.

Review of issues involving the trust is

limited by the deference accorded the trust, and the Board and
Division's broad discretion and expertise.
4.

The exchange was consistent with the obligations

and purposes of the trust and any applicable federal and state
statutes and policies, and was a proper exercise of
administrative powers that comported with any applicable
administrative procedures, including an adequate written basis
for the Director's discretionary actions.

The exchange statute

and Division procedures did not provide for a formal or informal
adjudicative process.
5.

The Director responded to NPCA's "procedural"

requests appropriately.

The requests for intervention and to

defer action lacked any procedural basis, was unauthorized and
prohibited by administrative procedures.
action was untimely.

The request to defer

Any requests for declaratory rulings not

responded to were as a result of NPCA's failure to conform to
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statutory requirements.

NPCA "procedural" assertions do not

provide for the relief sought in their petition.
6.

NPCA was provided the notice required by law and

also had actual notice.

The record shows NPCA's substantial

participation and an opportunity for informal input throughout
the exchange process.
7.

The Board did not exceed its statutory authority

by allowing public input at its meeting on the exchange proposal.
All administrative actions were performed by the Division.

Any

Board input was consistent with their policy-making role and
duty to "advise" the Director under Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-14.
Alternatively, any Board involvement would have been harmless
and "mere surplusage".
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION

NPCA brought this matter directly to this Court from
the Division of State Lands and Forestry as a Rule 14, R. Utah
S. Ct. "petition for review" and pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
S 78-2-2(3)(e)(iii)(1988).
The jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court is
established by statute.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(e)(iii)

provides in part that: The Supreme Court has "appellate
jurisdiction" over "final orders and decrees in formal
adjudicative proceedings originating with....the Board of State
Lands...." (Emphasis added).

Subsection (3)(f) provides

"appellate jurisdiction" over "final orders and decrees of the
-15-

district court review of

informal adjudicative proceedings of
agencies under Subsection (e)...." 12
On its face, Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) does not
provide any direct jurisdiction in this Court over the Division,
and only provides appellate jurisdiction over the Board final
orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings.
NPCA has only asked the Court to review Division final
actions and decisions, and restricted its requested relief to the
Division (i.e., rescision of a patent issued by the Division).
NPCA does not seek review of a Board final order and in fact
recognizes that adjudication is generally beyond the Board's
powers.

(Brief of Petitioner at pages 1, 2, 24, 52 and 56).

NPCA admits that it was the Division Director who "approved the
exchange" (Brief of Petitioner at 2).
Since this Court's decision in Adkins v. Board of State
Lands and Forestry, 719 P.2d 524 (Utah 1986), it has been clear
that the Division alone is authorized to make administrative
decisions for the management and disposition of state lands.
Thus, as matter of law, "final orders and decrees" cannot
"originate" in the Board.

As a matter of fact, no final order or

The 1988 amendments to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 substituted
"formal adjudicative proceedings" for "cases" in subsection
(3)(e) and added subsection (3)(f), effective April 25, 1988.
Utah Laws 1988, Ch. 248, S 4. The amendments appear designed to
implement the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and to clear up
ambiguity. The "formal adjudicative proceedings" language is an
obvious legislative interpretation of § 78-2-2(3)(e) and would
apply to this matter. Frank v. State, 613 P. 2d 517, 519 (Utah
1980) (amendment to governmental immunity statute applied to
pending action due to judicial policy to respect manifestation of
legislative intent in amendment).
nc

decree did originate in the Board. 13
Direct review of an order or decision of an
administrative agency under Rule 14 is only allowed
"[w]hen judicial review is provided by statute".
five state agencies listed in

Of the

§ 78-2-2(3)(e), only the

Public Service Commission and the State Tax Commission have
specific statutes providing direct review in the Utah Supreme
Court.

Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-16 and § 59-24-2 (1987).
The state land exchange statute itself, Utah

Code Ann. § 65-1-70, contemplates only an informal, negotiated
property transaction and provides no authority for a hearing
or for judicial review.

Although there is a statutory provision

for state lands that provides for "de novo review in the district
court" and judicial review in the Supreme Court, whether it has
general application to all state lands matters is unclear.

Utah

13
The Adkins case also points to a possible ambiguity in the
reference to the Board in § 78-2-2(3)(e)(iii). As explained in
Adkins, Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-1 (enacted 1967) provides that a
reference to the old "State Land Board" would be construed as
"Division" unless a section in Title 65 related to policy-making,
where it would be construed as "Board". However, § 78-2-2 is
much more recent and does not require interpretation of the term
"State Land Board". Even if the reference to the Board of State
Lands in § 78-2-2 could be construed as meaning "Division", there
was no formal adjudication by either the Board or Division.
-17-

Code Ann. § 65-1-9(2)(1986, repealed 1988). *
The Legislature's the use of the word "appellate" when
describing the jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court over agency
actions, limits the direct review of this court to those matters
where a formal, trial-type proceeding has generated an evidentiary record, such as in formal agency adjudicative hearings or
after review in the district court.

Peatross v. Board of

Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 555 P. 2d 281, 284 (Utah 1976)
(defines appellate jurisdiction as on the record after hearing).
This is consistent with the "formal adjudicatory proceeding"
limitation in § 78-2-2(3) on direct Supreme Court review.
Although the Utah Administrative Procedures Act
was not effective when the agency proceedings commenced, any
confusion that may exist in Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) has been
cured for any future Division adjudicative actions.

For purposes

of judicial Review, the Act distinguishes between "informal
adjudicative proceedings", for which there is de novo review by
the district courts, and "formal adjudicative proceedings", for

Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-9 has undergone recent amendment.
Prior to the enactment of H.B. 100, the Judical Article
Implementation Act of 1986, subsection (2) provided general
adjudicatory authority for the Division. See, Adkins v. Board of
State Lands and Forestry, 719 P.2d 524, 527 (Utah 1986). The
H.B. 100 amendment inserted the requirement of district court de
novo review, but apparently limited it to hearings as to
"preference rights" held under subsection (1) of § 65-1-9.
Hopefully, the new 1988 Trust Land Management Act, Title 65A, has
cured some possible confusion. With the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act also effective in 1988, there has been a complete
overhaul of the administrative procedures for state lands.
-18-

which judicial review is in the Supreme Court or Court of
Appeals, as provided by statute.
15(1)(a) and § 63-46b-16(l).

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-

Pursuant to Board rules, and as

authorized in § 63-46b-5, any "adjudicative proceedings" which
may arise in either the Board or the Division are initially
designated as "informal".

Utah Admin. Code R632-8-1 (effective

January 1, 1988).
Although matters originating in both the Public
Service Commission and the Tax Commission may proceed directly
to this Court, both are required specifically by law to have
formal trial-type administrative proceedings.
§ 54-7-16 and § 59-24-2.

Utah Code Ann.

In contrast, other agencies go to the

district court for the creation of a record prior to appeal
before either the Utah Court of Appeals or the Utah Supreme
Court.

See Erickson and Nelson, "To What Court Do I Appeal", 87

Utah Lawyer Alert, No. 1, at 14-15 (January 15, 1987)(concludes
that Board and Division actions go to District Court, then to the
Supreme Court).
Here, there were only very informal actions by the
Division and a minimal "administrative record".

Moreover, there

are substantial factual disputes between the parties, as is
apparent from the NPCA's sixteen page factual summary, their 283
pages of "supplemental materials" (which the Court excluded from
the record), and Respondent's motion to strike the brief for
reliance on those non-record materials and other perceived
liberties with the facts.
footnote 2.)

(See Brief of Respondents, supra at

The parties' factual disputes, and the lack of any
-19-

formal hearingf forces this Court to review without an adequate
record.
Though amendments to the Judicial Article and the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act may cause some confusion with the
Court's appellate jurisdiction, the one crystal clear conclusion
that may be drawn is that there is no statutory authorization for
direct appellate review by this Court of the informal Board and
Division actions which NPCA has brought before the Court.
Without this statutory basis for NPCA's petition, it must be
dismissed.
II.

NPCA LACKS STANDING

Every litigant must have standing as a jurisdictional
prerequisite.

In Terracor v. Board of State Lands and Forestry,

716 P.2d 796 (Utah 1986), the court considered whether Terracor,
a firm which sought to exchange property with the Division of
State Lands and Forestry, which later petitioned for extraordinary relief, had standing.

After considering the standards

for determining whether a litigant has standing, the court
concluded Terracor met none of the requirements and thus lacked
standing.

NPCA's assertion of standing is even more tenuous than

that asserted by Terracor.
The doctrine of standing assures "the procedural
integrity of judicial adjudications" by limiting the courts to
those "disputes most effectively resolved through the judicial
process" and prohibits the use of the courts as an "open forum

for the resolution of ideological disputes about the performance
of government."

Terracor# 716 P.2d at 799, citing, Flast v.

Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1969), Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1149
(Utah 1983) and Baird v. State, 574 P.2d 713, 717 (Utah 1978).
Terracor examined three bases for standing.

First, the

plaintiff must show that it suffered a "distinct and palpable
injury that gives him a personal stake in the outcome of the
dispute."

716 P.2d at 799.

Even if there is no standing under

the first test, a party may still have standing if "no one else
has a greater interest in the outcome of the case and the issues
are unlikely to be raised at all unless that particular plaintiff
has standing to raise the issue".

Lastly, a party may still have

standing if the issues are unique and have great public import.
Terracor, 716 P.2d at 799. Accord, Blodgett v. Zions First
National Bank, 752 P. 2d 901 (Utah App. 1988).
First, and most obvious, NPCA has alleged no "distinct
and palpable injury".

NPCA asserts that its interest in the

park's "scenic, aesthetic and recreational" values suffered a
distinct and palpable injury from the change of title alone and
from the moment that the land changed hands.

NPCA only alleges

that its members use the park, not that they use the state school
section.
NPCA's allegations of injury are completely
speculative, hypothetical, presumptive and premature.

Injury

for standing purposes cannot be presumed, and it is an unfounded
presumption that Garfield County is less likely to manage the

land consistent with park purposes, or to exchange with the
IE

National Park Service.
The facts in Terracor are analogous in this matter.
When the Division denied Terracor's exchange proposal and then
leased the property to another party, Terracor challenged the
leasing procedures under trust law.

Like Terracor, because NPCA

represents only park users, NPCA has no stake in the non-park
state lands.

Just because they wanted the state to exchange with

the Park and a decision by the state to pretend the lands are
park lands does not injure their interests in the park.
As explained in Society of Professional Journalists
v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1170 (Utah 1987):

"this Court saw

Terracor's writ petition as nothing more than a generalized
attack on the Board's mode of proceeding, an attack that could
have been made equally well by anyone.

Therefore, Terracor could

show no adverse effect and was denied standing." Id.
As to the second standing test, clearly there are
other parties here with obviously greater interest.

Although the

federal government expressly signed-off on this exchange*, since
the U.S. Department of Interior and the National Park Service are
specifically empowered to enforce the laws and

regulations

relating to the Park, they are in a much better position to
protect the Park than NPCA.

In addition to these federal

In fact, as will be explained in this brief, as a result of
the obligations under the school trust and, because of the land's
status as a "valid existing right", it may be more likely that
the lands will be "preserved" in Garfield County's hands.

parties, all parties identified in Terracor would also have
an interest superior to NPCA (i.e., a party seeking a
simultaneous exchange or other disposition of the same land,
the trust beneficiaries, the State Treasurer and the Attorney
General).
The Terracor Court declined to reach the third
test, whether the public importance of issues is so great
that they should be litigated in any event, because there were
other potential plaintiffs with a more direct interest.
Terracor at 800, citing Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d at 1151.
Certainly that is the case here.

Since the Terracor Court

could identify others with a greater interest, particularly
where school trust lands were involved, if the issues were of
importance, those entities who clearly do have standing would
have pressed the issues.
It is obvious from NPCA's unfounded assertions on
pages 11 and 12 of their brief that they believe this case is
about the "continuing public dispute concerning Garfield County's
efforts to pave the "Burr Trail", opposed by NPCA and other
conservation organizations."

Unless the standing restriction is

imposed, NPCA will be able to "bootstrap" its political "Burr
Trail" agenda into this proceeding, gain "inroad on the
representative form of government" and convert the judiciary
into an "open forum about the political and ideological disputes
about the performance of government".
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Terracor at 799.

III.

LAND GRANT TRUST LAW GOVERNS THE EXCHANGE OF THE
SCHOOL LAND SECTION INVOLVED IN THIS DISPUTE
A.

The Historical Background Provides
Essential Perspective

Utah is one of thirty states whose Enabling Act granted
lands for the support of schools and institutions.
Public Land and Mining Law, 44-47 (3d Ed. 1981).

L. Mall,

The purpose of

the land grants was to place new states on an "equal footing"
with the original states, which did not have large amounts of
federal "public land" reserved in their borders that was immune
from taxation.

Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559. 566-67 (1911);

Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).

See also G.C.

Coggins and C. Wilkinson, Federal Land and Resources Law 45,56
(1981).

As explained in the oft-quoted case of Utah v. Kleppe,

586 F.2d 789 (10th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, Andrus v.
Utah, 446 U.S. 500, 507 (1980):
There were no federal lands within the
borders of the original thirteen states when
they adopted and rectified the United States
Constitution. Thus, virtually all of the
lands within their borders were subject to
taxation, including taxation necessary for
the maintenance of their public school
systems. When other states were subsequently
admitted into the Union, their territorial
confines were "carved" from federal
territories. The "public lands" owned and
reserved by the United States within those
territorial confines were not subject to
taxation. This reservation by the United
States created a serious impediment to the
"public land" states in relation to an
adequate property tax base necessary to
permit these states to operate and maintain
essential governmental services, including
the public school systems. It was in order to
"equalize" the status of the newly admitted
states with that of the original thirteen
*)A _

states, that Congress enacted the federal
land grant statutes. The specific purpose
was to create a binding permanent trust which
would generate financial aid to support the
public school systems of the "public land" states.
Although a relatively large amount of land has been
sold in Utah over the years, approximately 3.7 million acres
remain unsold.

Despite this lack of success in land sales, even

a cursory review of the Utah Enabling Act and Utah Constitution
will reveal that the whole reason that the lands were granted was
so that they could be sold, placed on the tax rolls, and have the
proceeds create a permanent fund.

See, e.g., Duchesne County v.

State Tax Comm'n., 104 Utah 365, 140 P.2d 335, (1943); Jensen v.
Dinehart, 645 P.2d 32, 33-34 (Utah 1982).
As each new state's enabling act was drafted, each
state "bargained" for the lands to be granted, and in turn agreed
to provisions in its constitution to protect the trust.

Courts

have variously called this bargain a "solemn agreement," Andrus
v. Utah, 446 U.S. 500, 507 (1980), an "irrevocable compact,"
Oklahoma Ed. Ass'n v. Nigh, 642 P.2d 230, 235 (Okla. 1982) or,
most often, the "bilateral compact," Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp.
995 (CD. Utah 1979).

The consequence of the "bilateral compact"

is that the trust is as binding on the federal government as it
is on the states, even for school lands within federal enclaves
such as national parks.
As more states gained admittance into the Union, the
land grants gradually became more generous, varying widely in

purpose and acreage until 77 million acres for public schoolsf
21 million acres for higher education and a grand total of
319,759,585 acres have been granted to the 30 public
land states for the various purposes enumerated in their
respective enabling acts.

Public Land Law Review Comm'n,

One-Third of the Nation's Land, 243 (1970).
As the land grants became more generous, however,
the constraints on the new state's subsequent disposition of
the lands and its proceeds became more explicit and restrictive.
This was explained by the United States Supreme Court in the
landmark case of Lassen v. Arizona, 385 U.S. 458 (1967), as a
congressional reaction to "repeated violations of a similar
grant" which "consisted of private sales at unreasonably low
prices."

Id. at 464.

See United States v. 111.2 Acres of Land

in Ferry County, Wash., 293 Fed. Supp. 1042, 1047,
1968) and cases cited therein.

(E.D. Wash.

See also S. Rep. 414, 53 Cong. 2d

Sess. (1894); H. Rep. 162 and 2337, 52d Cong. 2d Session (1893)
(Senate and House reports on Utah's Enabling Act and the intent
of the trust restrictions).
Therefore, as Utah, like other land grant states,
succeeded to a large share of the lands within the states, it did
so by agreement with the federal government as to the terms and
restrictions on the lands via the Utah Enabling Act (hereinafter
"Act") and the Utah Constitution.
138. 28 Stat. 107.

Act of July 16, 1894, Ch,.

It is the terms and restrictions of the land

grants as set forth in the Enabling Acts, and the acceptance of

or

the lands upon those conditions in the state constitutions, that
give rise to the trust responsibilities recognized by state and
federal courts.
B. The Creation of the Land Grant Trust in the
Utah Enabling Act Establishes the Trust Terms
The Utah Enabling Act granted four sections of land in
each township, and other lands "in lieu" of sections already
subject to a federal or private entry, "for the support of the
common schools...." Act, Section 6.

The Act also grants

various quantities of acres for the benefit of eleven other
institutions to be "held, appropriated, and disposed of exclusively for the purposes herein mentioned, in such manner as the
legislature of the State may provide."

Act at Sections 8 and 10

(emphasis added).
In addition, the Act requires that certain proceeds
of the land grants be placed in permanent funds.

Section 10

of the Act "imposed the specific conditions on the use and
disposition of the school land grant" contained in Section 6.
Jensen v. Dinehart, 645 P.2d 32, 33 (Utah 1982).

Section 8 of

the Act requires that the proceeds of the grants to higher
education "constitute permanent funds, to be safely invested
and held by said State; and the income to be used exclusively
for the purposes of such university and agricultural college,
respectively."
The Enabling Act provisions amount to a "declaration
of trust" under standard, common-law principles of trust law.
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The trust was created when Utah accepted the grants, in its
constitution, on the conditions set forth in the Utah Enabling
Act.
C

The Acceptance of the Trust In the
Utah Constitution Binds the State
to the Terms and Duties of the Trust

The Constitution of Utah, Article XX, Section 1
provides:
All lands of the State
that have been or may hereafter
be granted to the State by
Congress...are hereby accepted,
and declared to be public lands
of the State; and shall be held
in trust by the people, to be
disposed of as may be provided
by laws, for the respective
purposes, for which they have
been or may be granted.
(Emphasis added).
Based on these provisions in the Utah Enabling Act
nd Utah Constitution, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that a
trust had been created and applied standard trust law principles.
Duchesne County v. State Tax Comm'n., 104 Utah 365, 140 P.2d 335,
(1943).

The Duchesne Court found that this grant "embraces all

elements of an express trust, with the state as trustee, holding
title only for the purposes of executing the trust; and is made
guarantor of the trust estate against loss." Id, at 371, 140 P.2d
at 338. The Court further explained that all elements of a trust
were present because the "trust estate is definite, the trustee is

_OQ_

certain, the purposes of the trust and the use of the fund is
definite, certain and particularly characterized."
140 P.2d at 338.

Ixi. at 371,

See also Jensen v. Dinehart, 645 P.2d 32, 33

(Utah 1982).
Although Section 1 of Article XX of our Constitution
tells us that the lands are accepted in trust, to be disposed of
according to law and the purposes for which they were granted, it
also says that they are "declared to be public lands of the
state".

The Education Article, Article X, Sections 5 and 7 of the

Utah Constitution provides that the proceeds of the land grants
are permanent funds to be guaranteed against "loss or
diversion."

The Jensen v. Dinehart Court considered the

"conditions and obligations of the grant of federal lands" to be
accepted in the provisions of this Article.
D.

645 P.2d at 33.

The Exchange of State Lands
Was Consistent With the Terms and
Duties Imposed by the Trust
1. A Two-Step Analysis is Applied
To Administration of Trust Lands

Since the landmark United States Supreme Court case of
Lassen v. Arizona, 385 U.S. 458 (1967), courts have applied
essentially a two-step process to issues involving the land grant
trust.

Initially, the courts analyze the nature of the trust and

Article X, was amended at the November 4, 1986 general
election, effective July 1, 1987, as proposed by Senate Joint
Resolution No.l, Laws 1986 (2nd Special Session.) Section 3 was
revised and renumbered as Section 5 and Section 5 was renumbered
as Section 7.
-9Q-

duties it demands.

Nextf courts examine the methods that the

state legislatures or agencies use to administer trust lands under
their charge to find whether the methods comport with the duties
imposed by the trust.

This same approach may be applied to the

questions posed by NPCA.

This will require an analysis of the

Utah trust and the duties it imposes, as well as an examination
of relevant state land statutes# rules and policies.
In Lassen v. Arizona/ the Court considered a plan to
allow state school lands to be used by the Arizona Department of
Transportation without actual compensation being paid for the
lands.

The state argued, and the Arizona Supreme Court agreed,

that the trust need not be compensated for the highway
department's use of state lands for public roads because the
building of highways necessarily enhances the lands.

The United

States Supreme Court disagreed and found that the grants to the
states for the various purposes set forth in the state enabling
act established a trust and that the "trust will be protected,
and its purpose will be entirely satisfied, if the State is
required to provide full compensation for the land it uses."
Lassen at 465.
The Lassen case is cited by other federal and state
courts as they consider issues involving the trust because the
rationale for the decision is that the land grants to the states
exhibit a general congressional policy for the protection of trust
beneficiaries and an adherence to the "bilateral compact."
Moreover, the Court intended its decision to apply to the
disposition of trust land grants generally, although the terms of

the grants differ among the states. Lassen at 460.
Briefs were filed before the Court by nine western states,
including Utah.

The Court stated that it decided to hear the

case "because of the importance of the issues presented both
to the United States and to the States which have received such
lands."

385 U.S. at 461 (emphasis added).

Thus, it is quite

proper for other courts to turn to Lassen for their own decisions,
even though they must consider different enabling acts and
different dispositions of trust lands.
The United States Supreme Court extended this rule
in Alamo Land and Cattle v. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295 (1976).

Relying

on Lassen and the earlier Ervien v. United States, 251 U.S. 41
(1919)(state plan to use trust lands for tourism invalidated),
the Alamo Court ruled that the state's enabling act and the cases
require that "the trust is to receive, at the time of its
disposition of any interest in the land, the then full value of
the particular interest which is being dispensed."
(emphasis added).

Alamo at 303

Like the Lassen case, the Alamo Court

recognized that the enabling act's constraints on trust lands
"indicate Congress's concern that the grants provide the most
substantial support possible to the beneficiaries to derive the
full benefit of the grant."
2.

Alamo at 302.

(Emphasis added).

The Trust Terms Mandate No Particular
Administrative Procedures for the
Management or Disposition of Trust Lands

The Utah Enabling Act and Utah Constitution do not
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provide any particular administrative procedures for school trust
land.

If there is any "litmus test" applied by the courts as to

trust administration, it is whether the act was consistent with
standard, common-law trust principles.
When the Lassen Court considered the procedures that
should be used by the state when faced with possible questions of
management and disposition of trust lands, the Court held that the
state "may employ the procedures established by the Commissioner's
rules, or any other procedures reasonably calculated to insure the
integrity of the trust and to prevent misapplication of its lands
and funds." (Emphasis added).

Lassen at 465; Alamo Land & Cattle

Co. at 301. Any restrictions in the enabling acts generally
required only "prudent management ...to preserve the usefulness
of the grants for their intended purposes."
3.

Lassen at 468.

Standard Trust Law Principles Apply
To Administration Of Trust Lands

In Utah, as in other land grant states, standard
trust law principles have been applied to issues of trust
administration.

Duchesne County v. State Tax Commission, 104 Utah

365, 140 P.2d 335 (1943).

As explained in the case of Coleman v.

Utah State Land Board, 17 Ut. 2d 14, 403 P.2d 781 (1965) the state
as trustee is charged with managing state lands "in the most
prudent and profitable manner possible."
P.2d at 792.

17 Ut. 2d at 18, 403

(Emphasis added).

In addition to the overall duty a trustee has of acting
with prudence, a trustee also has a duty to make the property

productive, and a duty of "undivided loyalty".

See, Bogart, Law

of Trusts, Ch. 9-13, 4th Ed. (1963).
A classic restatement of the duty of loyalty is from
Justice Cardozo in Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545
(1928):
A trustee is held to something stricter
that the morals of the marketplace. Not
honesty alone, but the punctilio of an
honor the most sensitive, is then the
standard of behavior....Uncompromising
rigidity has been the attitude of the
courts of equity when petitioned to
undermine the rule of undivided loyalty
by the "disintegrating erosion" of
particular exceptions.
In Ebke v. Board of Educational Lands and Funds, 154
Neb. 244, 47 N.W. 2d 520 (1951), the Court held that because the
"school lands are trust property and the state is required to
administer as such...his undivided loyalty and good faith, and all
his acts must be in the interest of the cestui que trust and no
one else."

Ebke at 247, 47 N.W. 2d at 522-523. Moreover, since

the state's "status as trustee is fixed by the Constitution, a
violation of its duty as a trustee is a violation of the
Constitution itself."

Id.

Since the beneficiary of the school land grant trust is
the public schools, it would violate the duty of loyalty to divert
the benefit of the trust to any other interest, no matter how
"scenic, aesthetic or recreational".
4.

The Exchange Promoted Trust Purposes
And Provided Substantial Benefits to
The School Land Grant Trust

When the exchange was finally approved by the Director,
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almost eight months after Garfield County's application, the
school trust received over 150% of the value of the traded lands.
The state received a parcel of land by the Garfield County Airport
and land in the Richfield City Industrial Park.

(R. 89) While

the Switchbacks Section had produced virtually no income since
the creation of Capitol Reef National Park, and was consuming
administrative expenses, both parcels are income producing and
marketable.
The National Park Service recognizes that while the
"State is also limited in its ability to manage these sections",
it "would be extremely difficult to put together one exchange
package under the regular FLPMA (Federal Land Policy Management
Act of 1976) exchange procedures."

(Addendum, Appendix B ) .

However, due to the express approval of Secretary Hodel, the
exchange will have no adverse impact on any other state/federal
exchange.
By acquiring lands that are manifestly more valuable
and manageable, the Division acted in the best interest of the
school trust beneficiaries.

Rejection of these benefits, in order

to promote NPCA's alleged scenic, aesthetic and recreational
interests, would be a breach of the school trust.
E.

Federal Statutory Law Does Not Abrogate
the Obligations Imposed by the Trust

NPCA asserted in its brief that "statutory polices
and other trust obligations provide for the protection of the
significant scenic, aesthetic and recreational values of the
Capitol Reef Section".

In support of this, NPCA cites the Capitol

Reef Enabling Act.

Brief of Petitioner at 35-36. However, NPCA

failed to cite a case that directly contradicts this assertion,
and ignored Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995 (CD. Utah 1979).
In Utah v. Andrusf a Utah federal district court
applied state trust law to hold that the State of Utah and its
lessee had a right of reasonable access to school trust lands
within a federal Wilderness Study Area in order to allow "full
economic development" of the lands for the trust beneficiaries.
Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995, (CD. Utah 1979) (Emphasis
added).

While the Court also found that federal statutes and

rules required the Bureau of Land Management to prevent impairment
of wilderness characteristics and degradation of the environment,
the Court concluded that due to the bilateral compact and purpose
of the trust the federal government could not prohibit full
economic development.

Ld. at 1010.

Not only is the level of protection of a National Park
statutorily more liberal than Wilderness Study Areas, there is
nothing in the Capitol Reef Enabling Act that mentions state lands
except the provision defining their status as "valid existing
rights", not subject to federal acquisition.
(1974).

16 U.S.C § 273a

This no doubt explains why the Capitol Reef "Statement

for Management" classifies the school section as a "private
development subzone" and recognizes that "NPS can exercise little
formal control over these lands". Moreover, the Park's Final
Environmental Impact Statement for the General Management Plan
classifies these lands for park development, with "[o]nly minor

effects on the socioeconomic environment".
Addendum, attached to this brief.

See Appendix B of

NPCA's assertion is unsupported

by both the facts and the law.
P.

State Statutory Policies Do Not
Abrogate Trust Obligations

As trustee, the state is considered to be bound even
closer by the bilateral covenant and imposition of trust duties
than the federal government was in Utah v. Andrus.

In Oklahoma

Ed. Ass'n., Inc. v. Nigh, 642 P.2d 230 (Okla. 1982), the Oklahoma
Supreme Court held that state statutes providing for low rental
leases of trust lands and low interest mortgages to subsidize
farming and ranching operations violated the state's trust duties
and were unconstitutional.

Regarding the impact of state statutes

on the trust, the court ruled that:
[n]o act of the legislature can
validly alter, modify or
diminish the State's duty as
Trustee of the school land
trust to administer it in a
manner most beneficial to the
trust estate and in a manner
which obtains the maximum
benefit in return from the use
of trust property and the loan
of trust funds.
Id. at 236.
In the Nigh case, as in the case now before the Court,
it was argued that "considerations of waste and conservation enter
into the situation and the attainment of a maximum return is not
a controlling factor."

Id. at 237. The court rejected this

argument because it considered income to be the primary purpose
of the trust, and ordered the Land Office to:

Prudently exercise their duty to
maintain maximum return to the trust
estate from the trust properties under
their control, subject of course, to
the taking of necessary precautions for
preservation of the trust estate.
Nigh at 239.
1.

State Planning Statutes and Rules
Do Not Conflict With Trust Duties

NPCA asserts in its brief that the so-called "multiple
use-sustained yield" statute, Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-14, provides
for protection of unique and significant lands of park quality.
Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-14 (1983, repealed and reenacted as § 65A-12(3)(b), effective July 1, 1988.

1987 Utah Laws Ch. 121, §19)

(Brief of Petitioner at 38).
NPCA's misinterpretation of this is symptomatic of what
has become one of the most basic disagreements between the
parties.

NPCA has consistently failed to distinguish between

statutory enunciations of overall policies for general planning
purposes, and particular administrative applications of that
policy.

NPCA's misreading of this general "multiple use-sustained

yield" policy as requiring a particular administrative action,
such as acting to preserve the scenic, aesthetic and recreational
quality of a particular school section, indicates a basic
misunderstanding about the role of planning and policy in the
administration of state lands.
Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-14 provides in pertinent part
that the "board shall determine the state policy and advise the

on

director on the management and control of all lands" and that
"the board shall establish comprehensive land management policies
for state lands using multiple use-sustained yield principles,
consistent with school trust responsibilities" (emphasis added).
The Division's position is that the reference in
S 65-1-14 to "multiple use-sustained yield principles", when read
together with other language in the section, is meant to guide the
Board as it properly performs its general, overall policy function
and develops general management plans.

In addition, any such

policy or plan would have to be consistent with the trust.

This

interpretation properly respects the Board's role as policymaker and advisor to the Director and the Division's role as
administrator and trustee, and is consistent with Adkins v.
Division of State Lands, 719 P.2d 524, 527. The limitation of
the "multiple use-sustained yield" principles to the Board's
planning responsibility has been made absolutely apparent with
the repeal of § 65-1-14, and the enactment of the new Trust Land
Management Act.
1988.

Utah Code Ann. § 65A-l-2(3)(b) (effective July 1,

1987 Utah Laws Ch. 121, § 19).
Moreover, the Rules promulgated by the Board define

"multiple use" and "sustained yield" only in terms of planning.
Administrative Rule R632-1-2 (Addendum, Appendix C).
NPCA's argument mistakenly takes legislative or Board
enunciation of policy, meant only to apply prospectively and
generically for future planning purposes, and uses it to address

a particular claim and a specific situation, such as the
preservation of a school trust section and prevent its
disposal.
2.

The "Surface Policiesw Relied Upon by
NPCA Was a Draft Document Superseded By
Board Rules That Allowed This Exchange

NPCA argues that the Division actions had to follow an
articulated policy.

NPCA has relied exclusively on a draft

document that purports to codify prior enunciated board policy,
prepared by the Division, entitled "Surface Policies, 1966 through
December 1986" over more recent administrative rules.
by NPCA to their brief as "supplemental materials").

(Attached
There are

several responses to NPCA's assertion that this document binds
Division Administration.
First, even if the "Surface Policies" had ever been
adopted and were still effective, NPCA's quoted portion leaves off
the admonition to "maintain the integrity of the trust" and
"explore alternatives".
did.

(R. 31-36, 94-97).

This is exactly what the Director clearly
Second, under the Utah Administrative

Rulemaking Act, such policies would have to be either "internal"
(i.e. only effective between the Board or Division) or would be
ineffective because they were "rules" that did not go through
"rulemaking".
Most importantly, Board rules that were in effect at
the time of the exchange provide for maximum value to be sought
for trust lands and specifically do not allow for protection of
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"non-economic" uses.

Administrative Rule R632-2-2 (1) (Addendum,

Appendix C ) .
3. Any Law or Policy that Infringes on
Managerial Prerogatives for School
Trust Lands That Reduce Value Are Invalid
Utah state lands statutes and rules consistently
contain the phrase "consistent with school trust responsibilities"
out of a recognition of the overriding nature of the school land
trust.

As explained in a recent Montana Supreme Court decision:

"any law or policy that infringes on the state's managerial
prerogatives over school lands cannot be tolerated if it reduces
the value of the land."

Department of State Lands v. Pettibone,

702 P.2d 948, 954 (Mont. 1985)(title to water rights on state
school land subject to trust)(emphasis added).

Since the

foundation for the school land trust lies in the enabling act and
constitution, inconsistent statutes and rules must give way to the
trust.
6.

School Trust Lands Are Not "Public Lands"
and Cannot be Administered for
Public Purposes and Interests

NPCA refers throughout its brief to school trust lands
as "public lands" and relies on cases that either deal with the
"public trust doctrine", applicable only to state sovereign lands
under navigable waters, or with federal "public lands".
Brief of Petitioner at 39-44).

(E.g.,

Not one authority dealing with

school trust lands is cited in the over six pages of NPCA's brief
dedicated to NPCA's assertion that there is a "common-law trust
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obligation" to protect unique values which imposes a burden of
specific justification for disposal decisions".

(Brief of

Petitioner at 38). This assertion is not only unsupported by any
relevant authority in their brief, it goes straight against school
trust case law.
In United States v. Ervieny the United States Supreme
Court considered a state plan to use school lands proceeds to
promote development and tourism.

As it struck the plan down, the

Court noted that:
Congress did not intend that the lands
granted and confirmed should
collectively constitute a general
resource or asset like ordinary public
lands held in trust for the people, or
that the proceeds should constitute a
fund like moneys raised by taxation
for "general purposes".
United States v. Ervien, 246 F. 277, 280 (8th Cir. 1917), affyd,
251 U.S. 41 (1917)(emphasis added).
A more recent case for the same proposition is Kanaly
v. State, 368 N.W.2d 819 (S.D. 1985).

In Kanaly, a state statute

closed the University of South Dakota at Springfield and changed
the college into a medium security prison.

The court ruled that

the statute violated the trust and was unconstitutional, and
ordered that the fair market value of the college be paid to the
appropriate trust fund.

In its discussion of the relevant law,

the court explained that the trust beneficiaries "do not include
the general public, other governmental institutions, nor the
general welfare of this state."

Id. at 824, (emphasis added).

A state court case as much on point to the facts at bar
as the Andrus decision is State v. University of Alaska 624 P.2d
807 (Alaska 1981).

In that case, the Supreme Court of Alaska held

that the statutory inclusion of state trust lands in a state park
amounted to a breach of the trust created for the benefit of the
University of Alaska and was unconstitutional.

Id. at 813-14.

Following Lassen, the court first found that a trust was created,
and then applied standard trust law principles to find that the
state had breached its trust.

The court concluded that the

inclusion of the lands in a park severely restricted the use that
can be made of the land and was therefore incompatible with the
grant because "the implied intent of the grant was to maximize the
economic return from the land....rtThis intent cannot be
accomplished if the use of the land is restricted to any
significant degree."

Id. at 813 (emphasis added).

Like NPCA, the state argued that the grant for support
of higher education was "no longer restricted to the narrow
purpose envisioned by the enabling act" and that the lands:
may be managed with multiple
objectives in mind, some of which may
be compatible with the support of the
university and some which may not be
compatible. It does not believe that
the university must be compensated for
placing the land in the park.
Univ. of Alaska at 810 (emphasis added).
The court found that the objective of park management
was "incompatible with the objective of using the lands for the
"exclusive use and benefit" of the university.
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JEd. at 813.

1. Neither the Constitution Nor Terms
of the Trust Allow Administration
For the Benefit of the Public
NPCA argues in its brief (Brief of Petitioner at 44-45)
that the reference to "public lands" in Article XX, Section 1, of
the Utah Constitution allows the state to "use school lands in a
broad public trust fashion, including nonrevenue uses",

NPCA

implies from this view that Article XX, § 1: "may actually be the
appropriate basis for recognition of a broader "public trust"
duty, at least requiring that Board decisions respect the public
interest in unique noneconomic values on state school sections
"whenever feasible".
This is simply not the law.

NPCA has cited no direct

legal authority for this assertion and it goes far beyond the
thesis and conclusions in the McCormack article which NPCA relies
upon so heavily.

W. McCormack, Land Use Planning and Management

of State School Lands, 1982 Utah L. Rev. 525 (1982).

Moreover,

this interpretation denies the clear language of Article XX,
Section 1, and overlooks every reference to the trust in the Utah
Enabling Act and the Education Article (Article X ) , of the Utah
Constitution.
First, McCormack's law review article cites no case
authority for the view that Article XX, Section 1 "could be read to
grant the state flexibility to use school lands in a broad public trust
fashion, including nonrevenue uses, so long as the lands are disposed
of "as may be provided by law". Supra at 532. 17
17
The cautious tone of many of Professor McCormack's conclusions
is obvious. The Professor is in many instances merely suggesting
possible, alternative views in order to suggest "flexible trust
land management" could be adopted as a land use planning policy in
new legislation. Supra at 547.
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NPCA has overstated Professor McCormack's thesis and
conclusions.

The Director actually agrees with much of what

Professor McCormack believes about the trustee's duty of prudent
management for the protection of trust assets for the benefit of
future trust beneficiaries, and that this may coincide with "noneconomic" land use.
97).

Supra at 534-535, 545-546.

(R. 83-87 and 94-

Alsof McCormack faithfully looks to the purpose of the trust

for support.

See supra at 534-535.

A central problem with NPCA's over-reliance on
McCormack lies in their failure to draw the distinction between
"disposition" and "planning".

Brief of Respondent, supra.

McCormack also recognizes the duties and discretion of
the trust, and does not suggest that a flexible management
approach must be adopted:
Even if the state views its obligation
narrowly to consist of obligation only to
the schools, and not to the people at
large, it still would owe a duty to use the
assets wisely for future protection of the
school system. Under certain
circumstances, that might mean choosing to
forego a proposed development project in
favor of preserving trust assets for future
generations of school students. It does
not mean foregoing a proposed development
project in every instance in which
preservation may be ascertained to be a
valuable interest.
McCormack's "narrow" alternative

dovetails nicely with

the Director's conclusions about the Division's current obligation
in the exchange:
In summary, the State has a duty as trustee
to manage and dispose of lands for the
benefit of the public school system. To
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the extent that preservation of noneconomic values does not constitute a
diversion of trust assets or resources,
such an activity may be prudently
undertaken. To the extent that there exist
several options for dealing with trust
property and the protection of non-economic
values is necessary for maximizing the
economic value of the property, such
protection may be prudently undertaken.
When such preservation or protection
results in a diversion of assets or loss of
economic opportunity, a breach of duty is
indicated. The provisions of Section 65-114 must be read accordingly.
(R. 89)
IV.

THE DIVISION PROPERLY RESPONDED
TO NPCA PROCEDURAL REQUESTS
A. The Division Properly Responded
to NPCA'a "Petition to Intervene"

In the Director's November 16, 1987 letter the Director
explained that the main reason NPCA's request for "intervention
or to otherwise participate" could not be approved as such was
because the Division has "no procedures under which a request for
intervention in the consideration of an exchange proposal might
be granted."

No Utah statute, rule or other legal basis in Utah

law was provided by NPCA with its request.

The Division also

concluded that "consideration of an exchange application by the
Division is not viewed as an adjudicative action under present
law".

The Division did not consider NPCA to have standing as a

party as there was "no basis for interjection of a third party"
into the exchange process.
1.

(R. 74, 75, 83)
No Legal Basis Is Provided for a
Request to Delay Division Action
and NPCA's Actions Were Untimely

Initially, although the Division saw no formal,
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established procedure for participation by a so-called "petition
for intervention" under current law, the Division did indicate
that they would "welcome any information related to the value of
the affected properties or any alternative which you may have to
offer."

NPCA was also urged to provide such information "as soon

as possible ...." (emphasis added)

(R. 74, 75)

It is not the Division's fault that NPCA did not
provide any additional information or data of any kind until
after the consummation of the exchange.

(R. 91). It was

therefore impossible to respond to the request that the Division
defer action.

What was finally provided was merely an almost

identical reiteration of previous legal argument.

(R. 39-41,

76-82)
B.

No Established Procedure Provides
For Intervention In An Exchange of
Land Grant Trust Lands

The pivotal point upon which the determination of the
intervention issue rests is whether there is any established
procedure that provides for intervention in an exchange of school
trust lands.

Without any legal basis for approving intervention,

the Division's action would be either without the Director's
authority and "ultra vires", or would be solely within agency
discretion.
1.

The Utah Administrative Procedures
Act Does Not Apply to Relevant
Board or Division Actions

In its "petition for intervention", NPCA provided no
authority of any kind to support its right to intervene.
-46-

They

did reference in their brief the definition of "adjudicative
proceeding", found in Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(a) of the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act.

(Brief of Petitioner at 25).

Unfortunately, the Utah Administrative Procedures Act was not
even effective until January lf 1988f which is clearly after the
consummation of this exchange and all relevant actions.

(R. 89)

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-22 (1987 Second Special Legislative
Session).
There are two equally compelling reasons that the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act is inapplicable.

First, Section §

63-46b-5(l)(G) of the Act specifically prohibits intervention in
informal proceedings:
(1)

If an agency enacts rules designating one or more

categories of adjudicative proceedings as informal
adjudicative proceedings, the agency shall, by rule,
prescribe procedures for informal adjudicative
proceedings that include the following:
... (G) Intervention is prohibited, except that the
agency may enact rules permitting intervention where a
federal statute or rule requires that a state permit
intervention.
Both the Board and the Division have enacted rules
designating all categories of proceedings initially as informal
proceedings to the extent that such may fall under the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act.

State Lands and Forestry

Administrative Rule R632-8-2 (effective January 1, 1988).
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Second, even if the Utah Administrative Procedures
Act were effective, a 1987 amendment exempted real estate
transactions from the section of the Act cited by NPCA.

Utah

Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(2)(g) (1987).
2. Neither the Board Nor Division Had Any
Authority To Adjudicate NPCA's Claims
The only case cited by NPCA in their brief in
connection with their assertion of a right to intervene is Adkins
v. Division of State Lands, 719 P.2d 524 (Utah, 1986).

In the

part of the opinion dealing with administrative procedures,
Adkins never even mentions intervention, and only ruled as to the
nature of hearings held under Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-9.

Adkins at

528.
Shortly after the Adkins case came down, however,
subsection (2) of § 65-1-9 was amended as part of the Utah
Judicial Article Implementation Act.
§32).

(1986 Utah Laws, Ch. 47,

That amendment completely rewrote subsection two of

§ 65-1-9, deleting all the language construed by Adkins as
providing general adjudicatory authority, and apparently limited
the subsection to judicial review for hearings held under
subsection (1) dealing only with "preference rights". 18
Because the amendment to subsection (2) of § 65-1-9 came as
part of the Judicial Article Implementation Act, and yet
subsection (1) goes back almost to statehood, and because
"preference rights" are such a small part of the Division's work,
the limitation of subsection (2) to preference rights contests
may have been a legislative error. Section 65-1-9 provided: (1)
Where contests arise as to the preference rights of claimants for
lands under control of the board, it has power to hold a
hearing
(2) Any party to the hearing may seek judicial review
of the board's order by petition for de novo review filed with
the district court....Review of the district court adjudication
is by the Supreme Court".
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This case is not a contest as to preference rights, and no
administrative authority was provided for anything else.

In

addition, the Adkins Court searched all of Title 65 and was
"unable to find any other reference in the Act that even hints"
at providing adjudicatory authority.

Adkins at 527.

Of course, since the Utah Administrative Procedures Act
is now effective, there is at least some future authority for
adjudication in the Division for those proceedings "commenced by
or before any agency after December 31, 1987."

Utah Code Ann. §

63-46b-22 (1987).
V.

THE DIVISION PROPERLY RESPONDED TO
NPCA'B DECLARATORY RULING REQUESTS

NPCA submitted nine requests for declaratory rulings
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-15 (1985, repealed 1988).
The Division Director found that NPCA had failed to provide
sufficient information as to requests one through six, and failed
to identify "statutes, rules or orders" as required by the
statute for requests eight and nine.

The Director only found

sufficient information provided and response appropriate as to
request seven.

(R. 83-87)

Initially, it should be noted that the Director
informed NPCA that the Division "would be pleased to entertain
any additional requests which provide adequate information.

As

an alternative, we would be pleased to respond in a nonadjudicative setting to any questions concerning the subject
matter addressed by the requests."

(R. 84) NPCA declined to

proffer additional information or take advantage of the
Division's offer of an alternative to the declaratory ruling
process.
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NPCA asserts that the Director erred in his ruling
and in not responding to the requests. Assuming for argument
that NPCA's assertion is correct, it would not provide grounds
the relief sought, i.e., rescission of the patent.

Nothing in

the declaratory rulings statute speaks to the relief available
for erroneous rulings, other than that implicitly available for
any administrative order.

No relief is provided for a failure to

respond promptly, or when there is a disagreement over whether
there has been compliance with the terms of the statute and
agency rules.
The statute does, however, state that the declaratory
ruling process has the "same status as agency decisions in cases
disposed of by the agency after hearing."

Utah Code Ann. § 63-

46a-15(1985, repealed effective April 25, 1988 by 1988 Utah Laws,
Ch. 72, § 32).

Thus, declaratory rulings are not intended to

have the general applicability such as rules. Moreover, the
declaratory ruling statute was not intended to "inhibit the
exercise of agency discretion" specifically reserved by Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46a-3(8)(a) (1987).
NPCA is trying to take an ameliorative statute that
allows a party to obtain a ruling on an agency position, and
twist it to find a remedy to stop the exchange. There is no such
remedy provided in § 63-46a-15, even for those who first properly
comply with the statute.
VI.

THE BOARD DID NOT EXCEED ITS STATUTORY
ROLE OR INTERFERE IN DIVISION ACTIONS

NPCA's only argument proffered in their brief for their
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assertion that the Board exceeded its authority and was overly
involved in the Division's decision is that "the only decision
reflected in the record is that of the Board, rather than the
Division."

(Brief of Petitioner at 52).
This is patently untrue.

At pages 88-90 of the record,

are the minutes of the Director's meeting wherein the exchange
was approved—with no Board involvement at all indicated.

In

addition, all correspondence, all analysis of appraisals and
other issues and any negotiation was done by the Division, not
the Board.

In particular, the Director's December 2, 1987 status

report to the Board shows clearly that the distinctions in agency
roles were respected.

(R. 92-93)

Moreover, the Board decision was completely contingent,
and merely approved the Division's recommendation.

(R. 48, 53)

In fact, the final terms of the exchange had little in common
with that presented to the Board, three and half months earlier.
The Division even rejected Garfield County's initial proposal,
without first seeking permission or advice from the Board.
The mere fact that the Board allowed the public to
participate at its meeting when the Division presented the
analysis of the application did not make the Board's action
adjudicatory.

By the Board's freely allowing public comment, and

the fact that the Division took advantage of this meeting to
solicit comment, the public interest was better served in the
process.
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Although the Board's role is essentially that of
policy-maker, it also had a duty to "advise the Director on the
direction, management and control" of state lands. Utah Code
Ann. § 65-1-14.

Without the Division's presentation before the

Board, the Board could not perform its advisory function.
Assuming for argument that the Board's action did
exceed its powers and was adjudicatory, then, following Adkins,
it would be

"mere surplusage", and not grounds for rescission of

a patent. Adkins at 527.
A.

NPCA Had Notice of And An Opportunity
Appear At the Board Meeting

NPCA alleges that its representative did not have
adequate notice of the Board meeting and access to information,
and first became aware of the exchange through review of the
agenda of the Resource Development Coordinating Committee.
(Brief of Petitioner at 14) As explained in this brief's
Statement of the Case, the RDCC meeting jLs the first stage that
agency actions have for public notice and input.

The record

demonstrates a level and pattern of participation in this matter
by NPCA that exceeds that of any other group.

The record

contains a September 7, 1987 letter from NPCA's representative
to the Director, and the Board minutes contain almost a verbatim
rendition of NPCA's comments to the Board and Division at the
September 11, 1987 meeting.
While NPCA also says that it did not receive the
Division analysis memorandum until the day before the hearing,

that could be because it was not ready for release until the
meeting.

Notice for Board and Division meetings met and exceeded

the public notice requirement of the Open and Public Meetings
Act.

Utah Code Ann. S 52-4-6(3)(a) and (b) (1977, amended 1978).
B.

The Director of the Division Published
Adequate Findings and Conclusions
in Support of the Exchange Approval

Although the Director approved the exchange at his
December 21, 1987 regular meeting, that same day he issued a
press release with an attached three-page, single-spaced
"Statement on the Exchange of Land".

(R. 94-97) (Appendix A)

Although the Division has no standard form on which it issues
written decisions, to the extent that an exchange of school trust
lands requires findings and conclusions, this document would
easily exceed that requirement.
In it, the Director discusses the nature and duties of
the trust, the details of the proposed exchange, the public
comment and consideration of non-economic values in state land
exchanges.

As to this last topic, the Director concluded that

the state "can affirmatively act to preserve and protect [noneconomic] values only if there is a net economic benefit to the
school trust that will be realized by such protection."

(R. 97)

CONCLUSION
Because the Court lacks jurisdiction, and because
NPCA lacks standing, the petition for review should be
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dismissed.

If the Court does find that it has jurisdiction and

NPCA has standing, then this Court should find the exchange to
be consistent with the trust terms and duties and a proper
administrative exercise of the trustee's discretion•

The Court

should further find that there were no procedural infirmities
with the Division's actions, that the Division properly responded
to NPCA's requests, and the Board did not exceed its statutory
role.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this*~> 1 S^day of October, 1988.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

DAVID S. CHRISTENSEN
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY That I mailed true copies pi khe
ioregping Brief of Respondent, postage prepaid, this ^pt\day of
JflMiv4^^ 1988 to the following:
Chris Wangsgard
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
50 South Main, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Patrick B. Nolan
GARFIELD COUNTY ATTORNEY
P. 0. BOX 388
Panguitch, Utah 84759 \
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ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
APPENDIX A: RELEVANT PORTIONS OF THE RECORD
APPENDIX B: EXCERPTS FROM THE CAPITOL REEF GENERAL
MANAGEMENT PLAN AND STATEMENT FOR MANAGEMENT
APPENDIX C: RELEVANT STATUTES, CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS AND RULES

APPENDIX A: RELEVANT PORTIONS OF THE RECORD

Roger Peart, Chairman
Patrick 0. Spurgin, Director
DIVISION OF STATE LANDS AND FORESTRY
MINUTES OF THE REGULAR MEETING OF THE
UTAH BOARD OF STATE LANDS I FORESTRY
DATE:

SEPTEMBER 11, 1987

PLACE:

MOAB, UTAH

ATTENDING:

BOARD

STAFF

Roger Peart
Douglas Bates
Calvin Black
James Bowns
Willard Gardner
Frank Nishiguchi
Loryn Ross
Chandler P. St. John
Max Williams

Patrick D. Spurgin
Richard Klason
Donald G. Prince
Keyin Carter
Stan Baker
John Lestlna
Marilyn Pratt
Kurt Higgins
Mike Grosjean
Louis Brown
Lynda Belnap

OTHERS IN ATTENDANCE
Richard Mitchell, Department of Natural Resources
Dotti Brockbank, Public Affairs, Department of Natural Resources
James E. Easterly
Phyllis Easterly
Donald R. Bauman
Terri Martin, National Parks and Conservation Association
Norman Henderson, National Park Service, Capitol Reef National Park
Noel R. Poe, National Park Service, Capitol Reef National Park
William K. Dinehart, Office of the Legislative Fiscal Analyst
Mack Helm, Shriners
Lloyd A. Scharf
Gary Oviatt
Tom Hatch, Garfield County Commission
Sherill Ott, Garfield County Commission
Mike Medberry, The Wilderness Society
Greg Kemp, C.P.A., Bloomington Ridge Development
Brooks Pace, Bloomington Ridge Development
Paul S. Rattle
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EXCHANGES - SALES (CONT'D)

3. Exchange No. 188 - Garfield County
Garfield County seeks to exchange certain county-owned property for a State
school section. The lands Involved are as follows:
State lands:
Township 34 South, Range 8 East, SLM.
Section 16: All, containing 640.00 acres, School Fund.
County-Offered lands:
Township 36 South, Range 3 West, SLM.
Section 5: NW4 (except airport), N2SW4
Section 6: W2NE4, NW4SE4 (except airport)
Township 34 South, Range 2 West. SLM.
Section 26: NE4NW4
The County-owned lands Include several non-contiguous parcels. The State
section sought by Garfield County is among lands addressed by the Board in
directing the Division to pursue the exchange of school sections entrapped
within national parks and military reservations at Its June meeting. The
State section 1s also addressed by a May 19, 1967, Memorandum of Understanding
executed by Governor Bangerter and Secretary of the Interior Hodel. The MOUprovides a general administrative framework for the removal of State sections
from national parks and military reservations through Federal land Policy and
Management Act exchange procedures.
To facilitate the MOU exchange, the Board withdrew lands within the pertinent
national parks and reservations*from leasing. However, the Board's action did
not address the processing of exchange applications for the lands otherwise
withdrawn from leasing. In addition, the Garfield County exchange application
was received by the Division prior to the Board's action to withdraw the lands
Included in National Parks.
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I L EXCHANGES - SALES (CONT'D)
3.. Exchange No. 188 - Garfield County (cont'd)
An economic analysis of this exchanges is as follows:
1. Comparison of the appraised value of selected and offered lands: Garfield
County has submitted two appraisals for the lands involved in the exchange;
one appraisal for the state section and one appraisal for county lands in the
Johns Valley area. Both appraisals were completed by the same appraiser. The
appraisals show value of the lands identified to be approximately equal in
value:
640 acres state land 3 $100/AC « $64,000
380 acres county land G 9200/AC * 576,000
The appraiser discounted the county land by $10,000 due to the fact that a
certain unknown amount of the county land is taken up by the Bryce Canyon
Airport facilities and runway, resulting in a value of (66,000.
2. Economic potential comparison (i.e. the degree to which there is a
reasonable assurance that the county land will provide income in excess of the
school section): A portion of the subject state section located along the
Burr Trail 1s presently leased by Ivan Lyman of Boulder, Utah, 6P 20555. The
leased portion, 240 acres, is included with other sections which total 1,040
acres. The number of AUMs on the entire 1,040 acres is 52. That Indicates
each acre provides about .05 AUM or about 20 acres per AUM. At the current
rate, the entire section returns 516.80 each year. This section has little
potential for any use other than grazing.
The offered lands have little use other than grazing. Some distant
opportunity may exist for some development adjacent to the airport or some
agriculture use of the offered properties near Widtsoe Junction. However,
that development potential use may be more speculative than real. The
agriculture potential would depend upon the availability of water. The
grazing Income would differ between the selected and offered parcel since the
entire offered parcel could be grazed. The difference however would not be
significant since the offered 320 acres at {.06/acre (the usual grazing permit
fee for the area) 1s not substantially more than the 240 acres presently
leased at J.07/acre.
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EXCHANGES - SALES (CONT'D)

3. Exchange No. 188 - Garfield County (cont'd)
3. Likelihood of greater revenue flowing to the trust from the sale of the
section: The opportunity may_ exist with this section like the sections In
Tooele Co. on the Ford; Bacon & Davis sale. I.e., some big dollars may be
spent by various groups to secure this section of land because of Its impact
and location In the park and along the Burr Trail (switchbacks). However, it
could conceivably also be sold privately to Garfield County if 1t would be
used for a public purpose. If it could be sold privately at the appraised
value of $100/acre, the state would receive 564,000 dollars which at a
conservative rate of 7% return would yield $4,480 in interest each year. This
Is considerably more than we could expect to receive from grazing fees and
possible lease fees on the county land if It were to be developed in the near
future. If this can be expected on a private sale, then it is reasonable to
expect at least that on a public sale and possibly much more. This does not
account for benefits to other state land management initiatives from
exchanges. The liklihood of greater revenue is therefore not clear.
4. Likelihood of greater revenue from leasing the section: The section has
no potential for leasing other than limited grazing. It is located within the
boundaries of Capitol Reef National Park and development is difficult under
these conditions. This section has been withdrawn from lease application
because of its involvement in the in-holding exchange.
Other analyses of the proposal are:
1. Garfield County Application
The Board has a fiduciary duty to the common school beneficiaries. This
duty includes:
a) a duty to seek full value in the disposal of trust property.
b) a duty of loyalty, I.e., the Board must strive to benefit the trust
beneficiaries and may not have, as it's purpose, the benefit of a third party
(particularly when no net benefit Is realized by trust); and
c) a duty to prudently seek benefits which are reasonably probable and not
speculative.
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EXCHANGES ' SALES (CONT'D)

3. Exchange No. 188 - Garfield County (cont'd)
As a practical natter, with the exception of exchanges such as the WOU
exchange,- land exchanges have been at the Initiative of parties outside of the
Board or Division or have been offered as an alternative to outside parties'
sale or lease applications. Accordingly, exchanges almost always arise due
to, and are motivated prlmarilj ty, benefits sought by an outside party.
There is therefore a credible argument that an exchange of value for equal
value 1s a breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty unless some other net
benefit is realized by the trust U tte exchange.
The legislature has indicated a value-for-equal-value exchange may be.
acceptable when scattered state lands are consolidated. Presumably, the
legislature views consolidation as offering net management or other benefits.
The Garfield County application would rtmIt in the removal of some non-State
inholdings from a larger State land block. Under some circumstances, this
could provide some management benefits. These management benefits Include:
reduction of boundary problems, contiguous land ownership for project
planning, reducing number of land owners involved in the management planning
process, and obtaining potentially more productive land. The possibility of
these benefits being realized as a result of the exchange may be likely if the
land is actively managed for purposes of income production or is suitable for
such management. However, the true likelihood of income is rendered
moderately speculative because the current economic activity in the vicinity
and the uncertainty of Increased economic activity in the foreseeable future.
Unless there is a basis for greater management investment for the State lands
and offered land, no benefits of consolidation will be realized.
Consolidation is not the only potential benefit that may be realized. If
there was a reasonable likelihood that an exchange would, in fact, increase
trust income in the judgment.of a prudent person, then an exchange may be
justified. From a grazing perspective, the difference In revenue is of
Questionable significance. See 6-2 above. Other economic potential 1s as
noted earlier, dependent on market conditions which are currently not
encouraging.
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£ i EXCHANGES - SALES (CONT'D)
3. Exchange No. 188 - Garfield County (cont'd)
As noted above, the Board and the Ofvision have an obligation to obtain full
value. If greater value can be realized by sale or lease and such a sale or
lease is reasonably probable, an exchange nay be a breach of fiduciary duty.
Assuming a sale at fair-market value, the sale.analysis in B-3 above would
indicate that selling the property would return more to the trust than would
an equal value exchange or lease. However, the Garfield County Commission has
indicated its willingness to identify additional property for exchange to
assure that clear benefits are derived by the trust, above and beyond an
equal-value exchange.
2. Relationship to the MOU Exchange.
Because the same lands would be affected by the Garfield County exchange (or
any sale option) and the MOU exchange, It is important to be aware of the
potential consequences of the MOU exchange. The Bangerter/Hodel MOU is based
on the assumed benefits of removal and consolidation of state inholdings from
federal reserved lands. However, the trust principles applicable to the
Garfield County exchange are also applicable to the MOU exchange.
FLPMA requires value for equal value exchanges, but trust duties suggest that
from the trust perspective some additional, non-speculative benefit to the
trust must be realized. Also as noted, benefits must be maximized. So long
as benefits of the MOU exchange are assumed, they do not support the
completion of the exchange. Until selected lands t r t finally identified, 1t
is difficult for the Board to determine whether the MOU is ultimately
consistent with trust duties. In fact, it will be well into the BLM
evaluation process before the true feasibility of the exchange of many of the
selected lands will be clear.
Accordingly, the status of the MOU exchange, even if it is assumed to conflict
with the Garfield County exchange, does not presently provide a basis for
denying the application submitted by the county. In communications between
the Governor and the Secretary, the Secretary has indicated that based on the
assumption that the county ultimately intends to transfer the land to the
National Park Service, there 1s no significant conflict between the exchange
with Garfield County and the Inholdings exchange.
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JL. EXCHANGES - SALES (CONT'D)
3. Exchange No. 188 - Garfield County (cont'd)
3. Relationship to other Potential Transactions
The State had Identified lands for quantity and deficiency selection 1n the
general vicinity of Section 16. Certain of these lands abut the Burr Trail
north of Bullfrog. Those lands have not been transferred to the State due to
the pending National Wildlife Federation lawsuit. If the lands are passed to
the State and if, as a result of the County's application, the Burr Trail Is
paved or otherwise Improved, the value of those selected lands could be
increased.
Comments through RDCC were received from the National Park Service Regional
Manager, the Division of Parks and Recreation, and State History. The NPS
feels that the exchange would disrupt or destroy park values, but has provided
no substantiation of these remarks other than noting that upgrading the Burr
Trail would lead to Increased vehicle traffic. The NPS Regional office also
stated its view that there would be a clear conflict between the exchange and
the MOU.
Parks and Recreation's comments stress that the Board's decision should focus
on the County's proposed use and ask rhetrocially whether it is appropriate
for the County to own lands within the Park. State History notes the presence
of a rock art site. No additional Information was provided. Comments have,
also been received from the National Parks and Conservation Association, and
the Wilderness Society.
The appraised value
and State land have
indication that the
Modification of the

of the tracts involved would indicate that the county land
approximately equal fair-market value. There is no clear
State school trust will realize financial benefits without
application.

The Staff suggests the following alternatives:
1. Approve the requested exchange with the County.
2. Determine whether the County desires to obtain Section 16 for a public
purpose and offer a private sale accordingly.
3. Offer Section 16 at public sale.
4. Approve the concept of an exchange subject to further evaiuatfon to assure
that there is a benefit to be realized from the County exchange.
5. Defer action until it 1s clear that benefits to the trust would be
realized.

1h
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3. Exchange No. 188 - Garfield County (cont'd)
The Staff recommends approval of Alternative No. 4.
The equal-value exchange 1s an Insufficient basis for approving the
application as submitted. Private sale and public sale do not assure that
either Income will be maximized or that opportunity costs would be
justifiable. Private sale may prevent effective control by the County and
would only provide appraised value. Public sale would be potentially In
conflict with the existing understanding concerning ultimate transfer to the
National Park Service. Deferring action provides no Incentive to the
applicant to offer more valuable lands or lana with higher economic potential
and presents unnecessary procedural hurdles to the ultimate decision on the
application.
The Director explained that because of the relationship between this, the MOU,
and other Initiatives between the Governor and the Secretary of the Interior
and because this Section 16 1s land within the MOU, we wanted to assure that
there was an understanding of the consequences in terms of policy 1f the
exchange were to be undertaken. The Governor recently had a telephone
conversation with the Secretary. In that conversation, the Secretary stated
he saw no policy conflict with this proposal with the assumption that 1t 1s
Garfield County's ultimate desire or goal to turn this land over to the
National Park Service. Since there seems to be no problem based on the
Secretary's communication, we are faced with the basic question of whether or
not the exchange application from Garfield county Is consistent with our trust
obligation. This Includes the economic analysis of the proposal.
Mr. Brown, of the Staff, stated that Garfield County has submitted two
appraisals. The values on the State section were $100 per acre. The County
land was appraised at $200 per acre and discounted $10,000 overall because of
the airstrip running through the property. The appraisals of the land appear
to be basically equal. Mr. Black, of the Board, asked If the appraiser
discounted the State Section 16 because of the road right of way. The Staff
Indicated he did not. The State land was appraised as fee simple unencumbered
land. The State section 1s leased, 1n part, for grazing. The County land
would be leasable for grazing. For It to be utilized, 1t would have to be
fenced. There might be some long-term use of the land 1n John's Valley for
agriculture. Public sale of the State section 16 1s difficult because the
Secretary's communication assumed that the land, by some means, would
ultimately get Into the control of the Park Service. Private sale holds some
question as to whether the County could transfer to the Park Service.
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EXCHANGES - SALES (CONT'D)

3. Exchange No. 188 - Garfield County (cont'd)
This exchange application was submitted to R.D.C.C. Comments were received
from the National Parks Service Regional Office, State History, and State
Parks. No other comments were received through that process. Since that
time, we have received comments from the Wilderness Society and the National
Parks and Conservation Association.
Noel Poe, Chief of Resource Management, and Norman Henderson, Resource Manager
from Capitol Reef National Park, appeared before the Board. They indicated
the Superintendent of the Park was unable to attend today. Mr. Poe stated
that the National Park Service protests the transfer of ownership of this
State Section 16 to Garfield County. Their objections are based on the
following.
First, if the land in question were to become County-owned, they feel the next
step would be for the land to be developed by the County. Any commercial
development along that road would be unacceptable and could hamper the
development of the Parks. The National Park Service also feels that the MOU
transfer would remove any other potential land use conflicts in the area. If
the State were to transfer this particular section to the County, they feel it
would not be in keeping with the intent of the MOU. They had not yet heard
that the Secretary of Interior had indicated he had no problem with 1t. They
have been trying to validate this Information. As of this morning, they were
told by their Regional Office that there still Is a conflict. If the transfer
Is recommended, then they recommend that the Division complete an EIA prior to
the exchange.
Mr. Ross, of the Board, stated that he understands that Garfield County would
give the land to the Park Service and wondered why the Park Service would
oppose that. Mr. Poe stated that this morning he talked with the Garfield
County Commissioners, and that was the first time they have approached the
National Park Service to tell them of the approach they wish to use to get the
land Into Park Service ownership. The National Park Service feels the MOU Is
the route to go to accomplish this. The Chairman asked 1f it changed their
position to know they would eventually receive the land back. Mr. Henderson
stated that, 1f the land 1s In Garfield County's ownership, It is not under
the Antiquities Act, etc.; and this concerned them.
The Board did note that the State has been trying to get out of parks for
years, but the valuation of the lands within the park has been a problem.
They indicated that they hoped the Park Service remembered how valuable they
feel the land Is when we go to exchange out of the other inholdings.
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EXCHANGES - SALES (CONT'D)

3;. Exchange No. 188 - Garfield County (cont'd)
Mr* Black stated the National Park Service has talked about reducing conflict
between agencies. He suggested this is a two-way street. He feels there has
been little support on the part of the Federal Government 1n the past. This
shows a lack of the spirit of cooperation. They need to become sensitive to
the needs of the State and counties where these lands are located. Mr. Poe
stated that at least the staff at Capitol Reef is excited about the
possibility of clearing up the issues of the State lands within National
parks. Their Regional office has brought up the question to the Bureau of
Land Management of valuation of these lands. They are working on a process to
deal with valuation.
Mr. Bill Dinehart, of the Legislative Fiscal Analyst's Office, stated that
Garfield County is still a part of the State and is subject to laws that
govern other State agencies as to what type of activity would or could occur
on the Section 16.
Mr. Henderson, of the Park Service, stated the NPS has never stated they are
against the paving of the Burr Trail. If the land is not transferred
Immediately to NPS, the land becomes valuable and could be transferred to
private ownership. Things could change. There 1s no assurance that the land
would go to National Park Service ownership.
Mr. Williams, of the Board, stated that whether or not the land would change
hands is a strong issue. This should tell the NPS that the State wants and
needs more cooperation in dealing with lands in National parks. The Park
Service 1s willing to receive the lands, but the Park Service has not been the
ones to give up the lands in trade. It has been BLM. Because of that, there
has not been a concerted effort to move forward. The MOU is able to take care
of this. He indicated he is glad the Governor is willing to let this issue
come to the Board in recognition that this may work in helping to serve the
needs of the State and the counties in getting out of the parks. This also
shows that there Is value In these lands. This gives us an opportunity to
show Interior that we should get the value for these lands that is there. Mr.
Williams felt the Board, by resolution, should dedicate the lands to Garfield
County with the stipulation that lands would be transferred to the County for
• specific purpose of transferring them to the National Park Service and that
the MOU would move ahead as otherwise outlined.
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3. Exchange No. 188 » Garfield County (cont'd)
Mr. NIshlgucM, of the Board, stated that he takes objection to the attitude
of the Park Service which Indicates that, when something Is privatized, 1t
will not be taken care of. He feels there is comparable use In the
privatization of lands, and that could be done In a very acceptable manner.
There could be orderly development no matter where the land Is. He also feels
that for the Board to put any kind of an encumbrance on the exchange with
Garfield County would not be legal. He feels the National parks should be
enjoyed by all, not just those who can backpack Into them. There needs to be
a re-evaluation of who they are serving, not just what they are doing.
Ms. Terri Martin, on behalf of the National Parks and Conservation
Association, appeared. She indicated they are a non-profit organization that
is established to watchdog National park issues and are here today to make a
formal protest to this application and represent
many people of the
organization. She submitted a letter to the Board which stated their six main
concerns. These are briefly as follows:
1. The transfer could lead to significant harm to the important scenic and
natural values for which Capitol Reef National Park was established, which are
of great importance in preserving Utah's image as a National park "destination
state". Failure to protect and preserve an area so obviously critical to the
character and quality of this major National Park would do serious damage to
Utah's reputation.
2. The proposed transfer would violate the spirit and purpose of the MOU
signed by the Secretary of the Interior and Governor Bangerter. The MOU was
signed as a recognition that one major Inducement for the exchange 1s to
permit consolidation of National park holdings and assure protection of the
parks, as well as to enhance the State's ability to manage State sections to
better serve Its trust obligations. They feel acting on this proposal would
have a very good chance of jeopardizing the MOU.
3. They feel ft Is doubtful that the Garfield County proposal offers the
State the highest values available for the State section in question. The
main point 1s that they don't really know until there have been appraisals.
Acting on the application prior to completing an analysis of land values under
the MOU and comparing them to these values would be a possible violation of
the Board's trust responsibilities.
4. There are serious questions about the basis for the appraisal completed
for Garfield County's proposed exchange. They have not had the Appraisal
professionally reviewed, but there appears to be a couple of areas that seem
to be arbitrary.
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3. Exchange No. 188 » 6arf1e1d County (cont'd)
5. They question the authority of the Board to take action on this exchange.
The Adklns' case requires that the Board act solely as the policy-making body,
while the Director Is required to make decisions on administrative natters.
€. They believe the approval or further consideration of the exchange would
be inconsistent with the policy adopted by the Board regarding the management
of sensitive areas. They feel there has not been a complete analysis done on
all the alternatives.
Ms. Martin stated they are also concerned about the procedure under which this
was considered. They feel there has been failure to give adequate notice to
the public for Its opportunity to provide comments. They also feel that
approval of this application could have serious effect on the Governor's
reputation to the citizens of the State who have concern for the sensitive
areas of the State.
Mr. Bates, of the Board, stated that Utah 1s an Important destination State;
and Garfield County has tried to provide access to attractive points of
Interest. People won't go where they can't get access to these site. Ms.
Martin Indicated their concern is not with the road, but only the transfer of
the land.'
Mr. Mike Medberry, representing the Wilderness Society, appeared and stated
that, if the land In question 1s to go to the Park Service, It doesn't seem
that an Intermediary 1s necessary. The proposal would conflict with several
areas, Including the spirit of the MOU and the Governor's Inholding exchange.
He Indicated that, while the State Is Interested in trading land It owns
within National parks, Garfield.County Is proposing to acquire land within
Capitol Reef. It Is difficult to imagine that the Board would approve
Garfield County's proposal without recognizing that such an approval could
make the Governor's exchange difficult to accomplish. Mr. Medberry stated
that, 1n an article 1n the Salt Lake Tribune of September 3, It was noted that
the land could be used as leverage for authorizing the freeing-up of the money
for paving the Burr Trail. He felt that Is an outrageous statement. Mr.
Medberry asks that the Board not approve the proposal for Garfield County to
exchange this land.
Mr. Bates, of the Board, asked If the Wilderness Society was willing to go to
the people In Congress who are blocking the appropriated monies and get them
released. Garfield County has been ytry up-front with their proposal of why
they want these lands. They only want to get the road paved.
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3. Exchange No. 188 - Garfield County (cont'd)
Mr. Williams, of the Board, stated that Ms. Martin and Mr. Medberry have
expressed some valid concerns that the land might not be transferred to the
National Park Service. He stated that the representation that the Board has
from Garfield County Is that the land would be transferred. The Board feels
this 1s actually what would happen. If that 1s stipulated 1n the exchange, he
doesn't see any reasons to challenge It.
Mr. Tom Hatch, of the Garfield County Commission, stated they had only a
couple of points to make. The airport lands are fenced. The 380 acres that
1s proposed to be exchanged 1s already contiguous to a larger State land
block. They ask for the support of the Board in approving this exchange.
The Director noted that the Staff's recommendation Is that the exchange be
approved as to concept subject to further evaluation of the County's offer to
ensure that the value of the trust for the exchange 1s better that equal value.
St. John / Bates. Unanimously approved.
"I move we approve the Staff's recommendation."

Meeting adjourned at 12:35 p.m.

ROGER p£AftT,
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December 21, 1987

Mr. Chris Wangsgard
Attorney at Law
Suite 1600
50 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Dear Mr. Wangsgard:
In two letters dated October 16, 1987, the National Parks and Conservation
Association (NPCA) (1) petitioned for "intervention in pending proceedings"
relative to the exchange of State lands entrapped within Glen Canyon National
Recreation Area for land offered by Garfield County and (2) requested several
declaratory rulings. The Division responded to the Petition for Intervention
in an earlier letter, noting that the exchange 1s not an adjudicative proceeding for which intervention is appropriate under current law. Nonetheless, the
Division invited the NPCA to provide additional Information it felt relevant
to the values Involved in the proposed exchange.
In response to NPCA's request for declaratory rulings, please note that, 1n
accordance with Utah Code Ann., Section 63-46a-3(8)(a), Section 63-46a-15 is
not intended to inhibit the exercise of agency discretion within the limits
prescribed by statute or rule. Accordingly, both the provisions of Section
63-46a-15 and R632-7 are to be read in a manner that does not unduly restrict
the discretion of the Division. Section 65-46a-15 contemplates an
adjudicative process, the result of which has the same status as agency decisions jln cases disposed of by an agency after hearing. Section 63-46a-15 1s
not an alternative to rulemaking. Accordingly, It Is not considered to provide for rulings of general applicability.
Pursuant to Section 65-46a-15, the Board of State Lands and Forestry has
promulgated Rule R632-7. Section R632-7-4 specifies requirements for the
petition form. Included in the section is a requirement for the description
of the need or reason for the applicability review. Requirements for statevents of reasons or need for a declaratory ruling relate to the adjudicative
nature of a declaratory ruling and the statutory implication that a circumstance under which a declaratory ruling Is appropriate 1s essentially the same
as a case adjudicated by an agency. This underscores the concept that
declaratory rulings are not intended by the legislature to be of general
applicability. Accordingly, declaratory rulings must focus on the rights,
status, or legal relationships of Identified individuals. Petitioners must
provide Information that establishes the relationship between the request for
a declaratory ruling and their legally cognizable Interests.
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With respect to the requests identified in your letter as Nos. 1 - 6 , the NPCA
has provided inadequate information to assure that responses to the requests
are necessary to protect or preserve NPCA's rights, status, or legal
relationships. For Request No's. 1 and 2, NCPA indicates no relationship
between any particular interest and the allocation of responsibilities between
the Board and Division of State Lands and Forestry. Similarly, for Request
No's. 3, 4, and 5, NCPA indicates no relationship between any particular
Interest and appraisement responsibilities. For Request No. 6, NPCA states no
relationship between land management policy documentation requirements and any
particular interest.
No declaratory rulings on these requests can be responsibly provided on the
basis of the information submitted. We would be pleased to entertain any
additional requests which provide adequate information. As an alternative, we
would be pleased to respond in a non-adjudicative setting to any questions
concerning the subject matter addressed by the requests.
Requests Nos. 8 and 9 in NPCA's letter refer to "policies- in the Division's
"Surface Policies" document. The Division has no "Surface Policy" document
providing for either management of sensitive areas or environmental
assessments. In the past, the Division has attempted to compile an organized
collection of statements reflecting Board actions. This compilation was never
finalized. Presumably, Requests Nos. 8 and 9 refer to this draft
compilation. This draft document has not been authorized by either the
Division or the Board in accordance with the Administrative Rulemaking Act or
any other law and is not binding on either the Board or Division.
Accordingly, there is no basis for a declaratory ruling with respect to the
applicability of provisions of the unapproved compilation.
Section 63-46a-15 and Rule 632-7 refer to the determination of
cability of statutes, rules, or orders. Assuming there were a
Policy" document as referred in NPCA's request, these policies
neither statutes, rules, or orders and, accordingly, would not
declaratory ruling requirements.

the applifinal "Surface
would be
be subject to

With respect to request No. 7, the NPCA asserts substantial Interests without
specifying what those interests are. However, with the accompanying Petition
for Intervention, the NPCA asserts with some particularity those injuries It
fears will be associated with the proposed land exchange. Thus, although the
form of the petition Is not In strict compliance with Rule R632-7-4, NPCA has
provided adequate Information relative to NPCA's stake in the resolution to
«llow a review of applicability to some extent.
NPCA states "Many of Its members use and enjoy Capitol Reef National park
for hiking, birdwatcMng, camping, scenic, aesthetic, and other personal or
recreational pursuits. NPCA also represents the views of other Americans who
use and enjoy the national parks by actively advocating the preservation of
national park resources In an unimpaired state."
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*• • • The State parcel that Garfield County seeks to acquire, located
entirely within the boundaries of Capitol Reef National Park, has long been
recognized as an area of unique scenic beauty, pristine character, and primitive recreational quality. The proposed transfer, however, If approved, would
permit Garfield County to attempt commercial or other development of the Park
section. Any such development within Capitol Reef National Park will substantially Injure the Park's unimpaired quality and result in direct Injury to
NPCA members and others who use and enjoy the Park. • ."
These statements Indicate the NPCA Interest 1n the preservation or destruction
of scenic, aesthetic, and recreational values It speculates could result from
an exchange. This 1s the case even though the Information concerning the
effect of an exchange on NPCA's Interests are founded upon untested
assumptions. Principally, NPCA assumes that the possibilities for development
by Garfield County are fundamentally different from or better than
possibilities for State-sponsored development. This Is not clearly the case.
Nonetheless, the relationships between the feared Impacts and NPCA's proferred
Interests 1s sufficiently articulated to enable a limited ruling.
NPCA asks for a ruling as to whether, under 65-1-14 and other applicable
statutes, constitutional provisions, rules, or policy decisions by the Board
or Division may give preference to the protection of Identified non-economic
values.
Rule 632-7 requires the Identification of the statute, rule, or order for
which applicability review 1s requested. NPCA has only Identified Section
65-1-14 in accordance with this rule. No declaratory ruling concerning
unspecified statutes, constitutional provisions, rules, or orders will be made
except as deemed necessary to determine the applicability of Section 65-1-14.
Section 65-1-14 addresses, 1n relevant part:
(1) The assignment of policy-making responsibility to the Board and direction,
management, and control of certain State lands to the Division. These lands
include land granted to the State by the Federal government (trust lands) and
submerged lands to which the State Is entitled (sovereign lands).
(2) The "establishment of comprehensive land management policies using
au1t1p1e-use/susta1ned-y1e1d principles, consistent with school trust responsibilities.*
(3) The sale or lease of State land in the best Interest of the State 1n
Accordance with the law.
(4) The reservation of coal and other mineral lands from sale.
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(5) The setting aside of the beds of lakes and streams to which the State 1s
entitled for park and recreation purposes.
(6) The definitions of "multiple-use" and "sustained yield".
Section 65-1-14 provides no express requirement for giving preference to the
protection of scenic, aesthetic, or recreational values in the management of
the section of land sought by Garfield County, although there 1s express
consideration of similar values with respect to sovereign lands. Likewise,
this Section provides no express prohibition of such a preference. Consequently, propriety of giving such a preference or the prohibition of such
depends on whether it may be inferred to be permissible under Section
65-1-14.
The section of land sought by Garfield County was granted to the State in
accordance with Section 6 of the Utah Enabling Act. This section provides
that the section in question is "hereby granted to said State for the support
of common schools." This grant of Section 16 was accepted pursuant to
Article XX of the Utah Constitution. Article XX provides that all lands of
the State that have been or may hereafter be granted to the State by Congress
are hereby accepted . . . and shall be held in trust for the people, to be
disposed of as may be provided by law for the respective purposes for which
they have been or may be granted. . ." (emphasis added). Therefore, Section
16 is held in trust to be disposed of as provided by law for the support of
the common schools.
The Constitution of the State does not specify standards applicable to trustee
actions on behalf of beneficiary Institutions, except with respect to the
management of the proceeds from sale and resource exploitation under Article
X, Section 5, of the Constitution. Nonetheless, because the land Is a trust
asset, land management actions must be consistent with trust duty.
Accordingly, the Board and the Division have treated the management of land as
subject to the same fiduciary duties as those applicable to the funds.
Duties of trustees are focused on the cestui que trust and the fulfillment of
the settlor's intent. Accordingly, the land in question is managed for the
support of the common schools. A trustee's loyalty to the trust beneficiary
must be undivided. Objectives of support of the public schools should not be
subordinated to the pursuit of other values on the land impressed with the
trust. (See Informal Attorney General's Opinion 85-62.)
It follows that provisions of Section 65-1-14 may not be read as producing
such a subordination. Section 65-1-14, in relationship to the school trust,
must be interpreted and applied consistently with the trustee's duty of
loyalty. The requirement for "establishment of comprehensive land management
policies using mu1tip1e-use/susta1ned-yield principles* suggests that the
nanagement and use of scenic, aesthetic, and recreational resources on State
land might be granted status equal to economic considerations 1n regard to the
particular Section 16, based on the statutory definition of
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multlple-use/sustalned-yleld. However, taking Into account "trust responsibilities" discussed above, management policies for school lands are obliged to
operate within a framework of economic advantage to the beneficiaries of the
trust. Provisions of the Section 65-1-14 for the sale or lease of lands and
reservation of mineral estates reflect the legislature's disposition to
realize economic advantage from trust lands.
Because the beneficiary of the trust 1s actually an "open class", the trustee
has an obligation to conserve trust asset value so as to assure that present
members of the class are not unduly benefited at expense of future members.
To the extent that trust asset value correlates with non-economic values, the
trustee may prudently conserve non-economic values. Without this correlation,
affirmative expenditure of trust resources to conserve noneconomic values Indicates a breach of duty.
The State and its trust officers cannot prudently expend trust resources to
preserve values that do not provide economic advantage. Scenic, aesthetic,
and recreational values may, In some instances, provide economic benefit to
the beneficiaries. In fact, there have reportedly been several Instances 1n
which an opportunity for economic development of State land plainly depended
upon the protection of what are otherwise considered to be non-economic
values. However, when there 1s a choice between two actions, both of which
provide some measure of economic benefit to beneficiaries of the school trust,
a prudent trustee must balance the risk of each choice in light of the anticipated benefit. If the trustee determines, in the reasonable exercise of Its
discretion, that greater economic benefit would likely flow from activities
dependent upon the preservation of scenic, aesthetic, and recreational
resources, the trustee would have dear authority to preserve those values.
On the other hand, If the trustee determines that other choices provide
greater economic advantage, then the preservation of those values at the
expense of economic benefit from other options indicates a breach of fiduciary
duty.
In summary, the State has a duty as trustee to manage and dispose of lands for
the benefit of the public school system. To the extent that preser- vation of
non-economic values does not constitute a diversion of trust assets or
resources, such an activity nay be prudently undertaken. To the extent that
there exist several options for dealing with trust property and the protection
of non-economic values 1s necessary for maximizing the economic value of the
property, such protection nay be prudently undertaken. When such preservation
or protection results 1n a diversion of assets or loss of economic
opportunity, a breach of duty 1s Indicated. The provisions of Section 65-1-14
oust be read accordingly.

Aftr/lk

DECEMBER 21, 1987
THE DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION OF STATE LANDS & FORESTRY TOOK FORMAL
ACTION ON DECEMBER 21. 1967 AT 9:30 A.M. IN THE DIVISION OF STATE LANDS &
FORESTRY OFFICE. 355 WEST NORTH TEMPLE. 3 TRIAD CENTER. SUITE 400, SALT LAKE
CITY, UTAH 84180-1204. ON THE BELOW LISTED MINERAL AND SURFACE BUSINESS
MATTERS AS INDICATED.
• * *
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MINERAL LEASE APPLICATIONS

w

METALLIFEROUS MINERAL LEASE APPLICATIONS - APPROVED
OVEoC^

to/appr
Upon recommendation of Mr. Mansfield, the D1recto/
approved the Metalliferous
Minerals lease applications listed below at a rental of $1.00 per acre per
annum; royalty as provided In the lease form approved by the Board of State
Lands. The applications have been checked by the Mineral Division and found
to be In order. The land status has been examined and the lands found to be
open and available. The reassessment for these leases will be January 1, 1998.
Mln. Lease Appl. No. 43730
James D. McDowell
136 North California Ave
Industry. CA 91744

TBS, R3W, SLBiM.
Sec. 2: All

Utah
658.83 acres

M1n. Lease Appl. flu 43731
James D. McDowell
136 North California Ave
Industry, CA 91744

17 s. R3W,

Utah
320.00 acres

Mln. Lease Appl. No. 43732
Millard S. Jensen
720 E Three Fount
Murray. UT 84107

T13N . R1SW. SLB&M.

SLB&M.
Sec. 36: NX

Box Elder
:. 2: Lots 1, 2. 3. 4, SXNX 320.96 acres

Due $1.00
Mln. Lease Appl. No. 43733
Eugene Myers
160 North 300 Mest
Washington, Utah 84780

12/21/67

T28S. R9H. SLB&M.
Sec. 32: All

Beaver
640.00 acres

WW.
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GARFIELD COUNTY EXCHANGE 1 8 8 / ^ 5 /
At the September 1987 Board meeting, "
exchanging State land described as:

Board approved the concept of

T34S. R8E. SLB&M
Sec. 16 (Burr Trail)

640 acres N/L
Garfield County
to Garfield County for land located at the Bryce Canyon Airport
V*11»y ripirrthed as:

T36S. R3K, •iinr.M
Sec. 5: NH4 (except that portion contained In the N2SW4 airport rui"»>,"
Sec. 6: K2NE4 (except that portion contained in the N2SW4 airport
runway) and NH4SE4
T34S. R2W, SLB&H
Sec. 28: NE4NW4
Sec. 15: SXSW5SSW2

363.03 acres H/L
Garfield County
The appraisals submitted on these parcels of land Indicated that they are
equal In value. In dealing with past exchanges, the Board has engaged In a
practice of requiring at least 1251 of value on exchanges. Garfield County
was contacted by letter of November 3, 1987, requesting that they submit
additional land or other land equal to 150X of appraised value of the State
property. The county has now submitted additional land located In the
Richfield City Industrial Park described as Lots 24 and 25 containing 3.03
acres with an appraised value of $33,500. This value added to the $65,000
value for the Johns Valley and Bryce Canyon Airport property would be 151.51
of value exchange.
$65,000 • $35,000 • $98.
$65.000 appraised value
$98.5O0/$65.OO0

-

County Property
State Property
1M «

Staff has reviewed all the submitted appraisals and consider them satisfactory
In accordance with generally accepted appraisal standards.
Based on the above, the staff recommends that the Director approve the
exchange to Garfield County.

1w
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January I1;1. 1988

Mr. C h r b Wangsgard
Attorney at Law
Suite 1600
50 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah

84144

We have received your letter of December 18, 1987, in which you request (1)
that prior to any approval of the exchange between the State and 6arfie1d
County, NPCA be provided with responses to declaratory ruling requests with
reasonable opportunity thereafter to proffer factual submissions or legal
argument in opposition to the exchange and (2) that before any approval of the
exchange, the Division address and state 'the basis for resolution of several
stated issues.
By letter dated December 21, 1987, we responded preliminarily to eight of the
nine requests for declaratory rulings and responded finally to one of the
requests. Upon receipt of additional information, as Indicated In our earlier
letter, we will be pleased to consider the development of the declaratory
ruling on the other questions.
With respect to the Inquiries 1n your December 18 letter, it 1s not possible
to honor your request for discussions of the various Issues raised prior to
the exchange approval. The request, although dated December 18, 1987, was not
received until December 24, 1987, which was three days after the approval of
the exchange.
Please feel free to contt

FDS/lb
cc: David S. Chrlstensen
Terrl Martin

irther assistance.
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STATEMENT ON THE EXCHANGE OF LAND BETWEEN

RELATED TO THE SWITCHBACKS SECTION OF THE BURR TRAIL
On December 21, 1987, the Director of the Division of State Lands and
Forestry approved the exchange of State land entrapped within the boundaries
of Capitol Reef National Park for certain lands offered by Garfield County.
Authority for the approval of the exchange Is based on Utah Code Annotated
Section 65-1-2.1, which provides that "the Division of State Lands shall be
the State land authority", and Section 65-1-3.1, which establishes the
Director of the Division of State Lands and Forestry as the Executive head of
the Division.
In addition to being within Capitol Reef National Park, the State land to
be exchanged In accordance with the approval straddles the switchback portion
of the Burr Trail as It crosses Water Pocket Fold. The difficulties
associated with managing school trust land within national parks and the
disputes over the appropriateness of Improvements to the Burr Trail have
aroused considerable public Interest In these lands. This statement Is
offered to assist Interested parties In understanding the policy framework L
the processes leading to the December 21 approval.

In 1894 Congress made a decision which has significantly affected State
land-management choices. In that year Congress granted to the State certain
lands for the support of the common schools. This Federal grant, made with
certain conditions stated In the Utah Enabling Act, was accepted by the State
in the State Constitution ratified In 1896. The courts have characterized
this grant and acceptance as creating a "solemn agreement" or "Irrevocable
compact." These acts by the State and Congress reflect a commitment then and
now of State and Federal resources to the support of public education.
The courts have also regularly characterized this solemn agreement
between the Federal Government and the State as a legal trust In which State
land and proceeds from the disposal of State land constitute the body of the
trust. In keeping with the characterization, the State Is viewed as trustee
and the public school system Is viewed as the beneficiary.
Trustees bear several duties to beneficiaries. The duties Include a duty
of loyalty to the beneficiary and a duty to nake trust property productive and
profitable. The Utah Supreme Court has expressly noted the applicability of
the profit votive to State land Management In a 1965 decision. In addition, a
trustee has a duty to assure that profitability is not exhausted at the
txpense of future beneficiaries.
Hlth respect to the duty of loyalty, a trustee Is obliged to act first
and foremost for the beneficiary In disposing of trust property* Of course.
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In a business transaction, such as a ..... exchange, the party with whom a
trustee deals presumably Is also seeking certain benefits. Otherwise, that
second party would have no Incentive to go through with the transaction.
XL. The Garfield County Exchange
The Garfield County Exchange must be considered in light of trustee
duty. Because of the location of the State section within Capitol Reef
National Park, many types of economic development of the property are precluded for all practical purposes. The State, as trustee, must determine on
the basis of economic potential whether to retain, sell, or exchange the
land. To the extent that an exchange provides an opportunity for Improving
the position of the beneficiary through acquisition of land with greater nearor long-term economic potential, the State has sought to exchange entrapped
lands with the federal government and others.
The Governor and the Secretary of Interior have been exploring means of
changing land-ownership patterns for the mutual advancement of State and
Federal objectives. When Garfield County proposed the exchange, the Governor
discussed with the Secretary of Interior the possfbfHty that such an exchange
would Interfere with larger-scale exchange discussions between the State and
the Federal Government. The Secretary indicated to the Governor that the
exchange with Garfield County would not result In any significant Impediment
to other Federal exchange options.
Accordingly, the State negotiated '" Garfield County and agreed to an
exchange which, since there was no 1ntt •/•ience with the larger-scale
exchanges. Increases the economic value ot the State school trust land by 50
percent on the basis of land appraisals. At the same time, the exchange
results In the removal of State trust land from within Capitol Reef National
Park, thereby Increasing the options for economic use of the State-acquired
lands.
U l i Public Responses to the Exchange
The exchange has occurred after considerable public discussion of the
process and policy covering such exchanges. The proposed exchange was first
discussed in a meeting of the Resource Development Coordinating Committee
(RDCC). The RDCC Is established under Utah Code Annotated Section 63-2Ba-' ^
cejj to assure coordinated review of State agency actions which nay affect
physical resources within the State. RDCC review also provides an opportunity
for interested members of the public to comment on the proposed actions.
After the RDCC review of the proposal, tne exchc
.cussed
extensively at the September, 1987, meeting of the Bo
:e Lands and
Forestry. At that meeting, members of the public were again provided an
opportunity to make statements with respect to the proposed exchange.
Representatives of the National Parks and Conservation Association and the
Wilderness Society made statements In both written and oral form Indicating
their dissatisfaction with the proposal and the policy framework within which
the exchange was to be constructed.
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-3After consideration of comments received from government agencies and the
public, the Board of State Lands and Forestry approved the concept of the
exchange In accordance with U s policymaking and advisory responsibility under
law. This approval was subject to the assurance that the State school trust
would receive appropriate economic advantages from the exchange. During the
subsequent negotiations between the Division of State Lands and Forestry and
Garfield County, additional opportunity was provided to parties expressing
Interest in those negotiations to provide information related to the
appropriateness of the valuation serving as the basis for the exchange. No
additional Information was provided; and, on the basis of negotiations between
the County and the Division and verification of the appraised values, the
exchange was approved.
IV. Consideration of Non-economic Values In State Land Exchanges
Many people believe that management principles applicable to Federal
public lands are also applicable to State lands. This view Is relatively
accurate with respect to certain State lands. However, as noted In the
discussion In Section I above, school trust lands are committed to the
specific purpose of providing support for the public school system.
The majority of comments received from the public with respect to the
Garfield County Exchange reflected a concern about the protection of
non-economic values they believe exist on the land within Capitol Reef
National Park. Indeed, Capitol Reef National Park was established to protect
and preserve certain values. However, Congress chose to not provide for the
protection of those values on the former State section. It did so by not
changing the school trust status of the land Involved.
Therefore, while there may be certain non-economic values on the land,
the State can affirmatively act to preserve and protect those values only If
there Is a net economic benefit to the school trust that will be realized by
such protection. In accordance with trust duties, the State cannot unduly
speculate that such conditions are present; and no Information has been
presented to Indicate that the conditions are In fact there. On the contrary,
current Information compels the conclusion that failure to proceed with an
exchange which would result In an Increase In the value of the State trust
land Inventory (as Is the case with the lands offered by Garfield County)
would be a breach of trust duty.

APPENDIX B: EXCERPTS FROM THE CAPITOL REEF GENERAL
MANAGEMENT PLAN AND STATEMENT FOR MANAGEMENT

*•

State School Sections

The KPS can exercise little formal control over these
lands and, potentially, uses of the lands could occur
that would have a negative impact on adjoining
parklands. Due to their isolation and interspersion
with federally-owned lands, the State is also limited
in its ability to manage these school sections. There
is no mineral activity taking place within these
sections.
The NPS would like to eventually acquire all the
State's surface and mineral interests through exchange
for other (BLM) land, probably in several smaller
exchanges, as it would be extremely difficult to put
together one exchange package under the regular FLPKA
(Federal Land Policy Management Act of 1976) exchange
procedures which would include all the StateTs
ownerships.
Currently, there are four commercial oil, gas, and/or
coal leases in force on these school sections, as well
as numerous grazing leases.
2.

Private Property

In the last several decades, the KPS has acquiredalmost all of the privately-owned lands within the
boundary. A small 0.42-acre parcel, nestled In a low,
wet area of Fruita, remains unacquired. NPS envisions
no action on this single parcel as long as the status
quo is maintained. Should the 22 owners unanimously
decide to sell or donate their interest they should be
accommodated, if funds are available. It seems likely
that, due to the complexities of this multiple
ownership, a "friendly condemnation suit*' to clear
title may be necessary If a protective interest is to
be acquired in this tract.
3.

Life Estate

The Service purchased the Sleeping Rainbow Ranch
several years ago, but Mr. and Mrs. Lurton Knee retain
a right of "lifetime use and occupancy" on 13.13 acres
near Pleasant Creak.
4.

Trends

The park Is virtually surrounded by federally-owned
lands administered either by the BLM or the U.S. Forest
Service. Some private properties do abut or lie near

u
V.

MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES

This listing of objectives does not preempt the long
term General Management Flan (valid through 2001) but
charts shorter-range targets for park management.
A. Through research, secure an adequate data base and
in-depth understanding of the park's cultural and
natural resources
in order
to chart
credible,
long-range management actions to insure resource
protection and perpetuation.
B. Regardless of the present scarcity of resource data
and professional research, prepare and implement
practical, short-term operating plans to catalog,
protect, and interpret park resources on the basis of
the best available information.
C. Enhance visitor use and enjoyment of the park by
the early introduction of new visitor use programs and
facilities—in accordance with the approved General
Management Plan--as follows:
1.
Headquarters District—add Fruita Loop Trail,
Fremont Canyon Trail and the Goosenecks Road; expand
and upgrade visitor center
facilities; increase
interpretation of historic and aboriginal occupations
of Fremont
River Valley; and
improve
sanitary
facilities at Pleasant Creek.
S 2. South District—provide guided tour material; add
small parking areas at Burro, Five Mile, and Cottonwood
Washes along with trailhead orientation; and add a
10-site primitive campground at Upper Burr Trail.
3. Worth District—provide wayside exhibits at Gypsum
Sinkhole and Glass Mountain; mark hiking, routes to
Jailhouse Rock, Wall of Jericho, Middle Point, and
Temples of the Sun and Moon; provide small parking
areas at these locations; and provide a 10-site camping
area.
D. Provide reliable, 24-hour-per-day visitor access to
all emergency services. Including an upgrade in present
obsolete communications link with county ambulance
services.
£. Secure sufficient control over land within the park
boundary to ensure effective management and protection
of the resource, including those lands known as the
State school sections.
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final environmental impact statement
general management plan
statement of findings
October 1982

CAPITOL REEF
NATIONAL PARK / UTAH

SUMMARY
This general management plan/final
addresses the following issues:

environmental

impact

statement

Management strategies for preserving the resources and providing
for public use at Capitol Reef National Park
National Park Service recommended general management plan for
Capitol Reef National Park
Proposals for five boundary adjustments at Capitol Reef National
Park
Five alternatives, including the no action and preferred alternatives, are
described and evaluated in this document.
The present management
strategy and development level would remain essentially unchanged in the
no action alternative. Alternative 2 would retain the existing management
strategy and development level, with an emphasis on providing additional
hiking and interpretive opportunities.
Alternative 3 would propose expanding visitor use facilities primarily in
the Headquarters District of the park. Alternative 4 would emphasize an
increase in visitor opportunities and facilities on a parkwide basis.
The preferred alternative is a combination of different elements from the
preceding alternatives and constitutes the National Park Service's general
management
plan.
Proposals for management zoning, resources
management, visitor use and interpretation, general development, and
boundary adjustments are included.
Four major zones are designated in the proposed management zoning for
the park: natural, historic, park development, and Special use. The
majority of the park lands are zoned natural, which places management
emphasis on the conservation of natural resources and processes.
The principal consideration in natural resources management will be to
protect and preserve the natural environment for the enjoyment of park
visitors and for the integrity of the ecosystems. The National Park
Service will provide for the preservation, restoration, protection,
interpretation, study, management, and use of all significant cultural
resources through adequate research and programming.
The major focus of visitor use will continue to be in the Headquarters
District, with only primitive or minor developments provided in the South
•nd North districts. The primary objective of interpretation will be to
txpiain the significance of the7 Waterpocket Fold as a prime geologic
structure, as well as an influence on human use of the arid land in this
area.
The general development proposed has been phased so that increased
development will occur only after the attainment of certain Juncture

points. The maximum development proposed will include expansion of the
visitor center and associated administrative facilities (maintenance,
housing), expansion of the campground and its utility systems, and
addition of a walking loop trail in Fruita. Trails and a small horse camp
will be provided at Pleasant Creek. Development in the South Oistrict
will include a ranger station, a campground, utility and employee housing
areas, and a new road to the Strike Valley viewpoint. Additional trails
will be available in both the South and North districts. It is conceivable
that some of the Juncture points would not be reached in the lifetime of
the general management plan, resulting in only minimal or no development
vof associated facilities.
The boundary adjustment proposed would be the deletion of 1,400 acres,
placing the park boundary at the base of the Circle Cliffs, and the
addition of 300 acres at Glass Mountain.
Implementation of the preferred alternative will result in a net change of
impact on soils and vegetation of 26.5 acres over existing use. There
will be no significant long-term impacts on wildlife or air quality. The
expansion of visitor services will increase water demand and result in the
release of more wastewater to the watershed. A flood-monitoring system
and emergency flood response and evacuation plan will be developed to
mitigate the potential adverse effects due to flooding. The development
of new park facilities will result in a visual intrusion on the natural and
historic settings.
Increased visitor use could adversely affect archeological sites, resulting
in destruction or damage to these resources. Sensitive planning and
design of facility expansions will reduce the impact on historic resources
in the Fremont/Fruita Archeological/Historic District.
Only minor effects on the socioeconomic environment will result from
implementation of the preferred alternative.
implementation of the preferred alternative will increase recreational and
interpretive opportunities, improve visitor safety, and reduce congestion
at Capitol Reef National-Park.
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APPENDIX C: RELEVANT STATUTES, CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS AND RULES

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
Utah Enabling Act# S6i
That upon the admission of said State into the Union, sections
numbered two, sixteenf thirty-two, and thirty-six in every
township of said proposed state, and where such sections, or any
parts thereof have been sold or otherwise disposed of by or under
the authority of any Act of Congress, other lands equivalent
thereto, in legal subdivision of not less than one quarter
section and as contiguous as may be to the section in lieu of
which the same is taken, are hereby granted to said State for the
support of common schools....
Utah Enabling Act, 510s
That the proceeds of lands herein granted for educational
purposes, except as hereinafter otherwise provided, shall
constitute a permanent school fund, the interest of which only
shall be expended for the support of said schools, and such land
shall not be subject to pre-emption, homestead entry, or any
other entry under the land laws of the United States, whether .
surveyed or unsurveyed, but shall be surveyed for school purposes
only.
Utah Enabling Act, Article Z, $5*
The proceeds of the sale of lands reserved by an Act of Congress,
approved February 21st, 1855, for the establishment of the
University of Utah, and of all the lands granted by an Act of
Congress, approved July 16th, 1894, shall constitute permanent
funds, to be safely invested and held by the State; and the
income thereof shall be used exclusively for the support and
maintenance of the different institutions and colleges,
respectively, in accordance with the requirements and conditions
of said Acts of Congress. 91 (Article X was amended, effective
July 1, 1987, with Section 5 becoming Sections 5 and 7.)
Utah Constitution, Article XX, fit
All lands of the State that have been, or nay hereafter be
granted to the State by Congress, and all lands acquired by gift,
grant or devise, from any person or corporation, or that may
otherwise be acquired, are hereby accepted, and declared to be
the public lands of the State; and shall be held in trust for the

people, to be disposed of as may be provided by law, for the
respective purposes for which they have been or may be granted,
donated, devised or otherwise acquired.
Utah Code Annotated, $ 65A-1-1.
As used in this titles
(1) "Board" means the Board of State
Lands and Forestry.
(2) "Division" means the Division of
State Lands and Forestry.
(3) "Multiple use" means the
management of various surface and subsurface
resources so they are utilized in the
combination that will best meet the present
and future needs of the people of this
state.
(4) "Public trust assets" means those
lands and resources, including sovereign
lands, administered by the division that cure
not part of the school or institutional
trust lands.
(5) "School and institutional trust
lands" means those properties granted by the
United States in the Utah Enabling Act to
the state of Utah in trust and other lands
transferred to the trust, which must be
managed for the benefit oft
(a) the public school system; or
(b) the institutions of the state
which are designated by the Utah
Enabling Act.
(6) "Sovereign lands" means those
lands lying below the ordinary high water
mark of navigable bodies of water at the
date of statehood and owned by the state by
virtue of its sovereignty.
(7) "State lands" means all lands
administered under the authority of the
board and the division.
(8) "Sustained yield" means the
achievement and maintenance of high level
annual or periodic output of the various
renewable resources of land without
impairment of the productivity of the land*
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Utah Code Annotated, S 65A-1-2.
(1) The Board of State Lands and Forestry is created
within the Department of Natural Resources. The board is the
policymaking body for the Division of State Lands and Forestry.
The board shall establish policy fort
(a) the management of school and
institutional trust lands and sovereign
lands; and
(b) fire and forestry management
responsibilities as prescribed in Chapter 8,
Title 65A.
(2) Policies shall be consistent with the provisions
of the Utah Enabling Act, the Utah Constitution, and state law.
The board shall adopt rules under the Utah Administrative
Rulemaking Act necessary to fulfill the purposes of this title.
(3)

In carrying out its responsibilities the board

shalls
(a) use reasonable care to make the
school and institutional trust property
productive of income in the best interests
of the school and institutional trusts;
(b) insure that state lands are
administered under comprehensive land
management policies using multiple usesustained yield principles consistent with
the respective school and institutional or
public trust responsibilities;
(c) insure that at least fair market
value is received for the use, sale, or
exchange of school and institutional trust
assets; and
(d) insure that the public trust assets
are administered in the best interest of the
state.
Utah Code Annotated, S 65A-1-4.
(1) The Division of State Lands and Forestry is
created within the Department of Natural Resources under the
administration and general supervision of the executive director
of the department and under the policy direction of the Board of
State Lands and Forestry. The division shall be the executive
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authority for the management of the school and institutional
trust lands, sovereign lands, and the state's mineral estates,
and shall provide for forestry and fire control activities on
state and private lands as required in Section 65A-8-1.
Utah Code Annotated, $ 65A-1-7.
(1) The board shall make rules governing practice
and procedure in adjudication of individual rights and
responsibilities. These rules shall ensure procedural due
process.
(2) Upon the petition of an aggrieved party to a
division action, the board may review division actions and issue
an order modifying or rescinding division action inconsistent
with statutes, rules, or board policy.
(3) A qualified hearing examiner may be appointed for
purposes of taking evidence and making recommendations for a
declaratory order. The board shall consider the recommendations
of the examiner in making decisions.
(4) Any party to an agency order may seek review of
the order.
(5) Reconsideration of final agency action and
judicial review of final agency action shall be governed by
Chapter 46b, Title 63, the Administrative Procedures Act.
Utah Code Annotated, S 65A-2-2.
Management plans shall be developed for natural and
cultural resources on lands. The division may request other
state agencies to generate technical data or other management
support services for the development and implementation of state
land management plans.
Utah Code Annotated, S 65A-7-7.
(1) In accordance with board rules, state lands may be
exchanged for other land or other assets of equal value within
the state held by other proprietors. Upon request of the
division, the governor is authorized to execute and deliver the
necessary patents to other proprietors and receive proper deeds
of the lands so exchanged. No exchange will be made by the
division until a deed or patent for the land received in exchange
has been issued by the proprietors.
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Utah Code Annotated, S 65-1*70
In order to compact, as far as practicable, the land
holdings of the state, the Division of State Lands is hereby
authorized to exchange any of the land held by the state for
other land of equal value within the state held by other
proprietors; and upon request of the division, the governor is
hereby authorized to execute and deliver the necessary patents to
such other proprietors and receive therefrom proper deeds of the
lands so exchanged; provided, that no exchange shall be made by
the division until a patent for the land so received in exchange
shall have been issued to such proprietors of [or] their
grantors.
Where the state lands are encumbered by an existing
lease, the division, upon approval of an exchange, may with the
consent of the lessee terminate the existing lease and issue a
lease of the same type, without regard to provisions of § 65-145, on lands of comparable acreage or value which may be acquired
in the same exchange in which the leased lands are used as base.
Upon acceptance of exchanged lands, the state shall honor all
vested rights.
Utah Code Annotated, S 65-1-9 (effective until 7/1/1988)
(1) Where contests arise as to the preference rightsrof
claimants for lands under the control of the board, it has the
power to hold a hearing and to direct the taking of evidence
concerning questions involved, which hearing shall be reported in
full. The board shall make findings of fact and conclusions of
law, enter its order and notify the parties to the hearing of its
findings, conclusions and order.
(2) Any party to the
the board's order by petition
district court within 30 days
board's order. Review of the
the Supreme Court.

hearing may seek judicial review of
for de novo review filed with the
of the entry and notice of the
district court adjudication is by

Utah Administrative Code, 1987-1988, R632-1-2. Definitions
MULTIPLE USEi the management of various surface and sub-surface
resources so that they are utilised in the combination that will
best meet the present and future needs of the people of this
state consistent with the school and institutional trust
responsibilities.

SCHOOL AND INSTITUTIONAL TRUST LANDS: those properties granted
by the United States in the Utah Enabling Act to the state of
Utah in trust, or other properties transferred to the trust, to
be managed for the benefit of the public school system and the
various institutions of the state in whose behalf the lands were
granted.
SOVEREIGN LANDS: those lands lying below the ordinary high water
mark of navigable bodies of water at the date of statehood and
owned by the state by virtue of its sovereignty or land received
in exchange for sovereign lands.
STATE LANDS: all lands under the authority of the Board of State
Lands and Forestry.
SUSTAINED YIELD: the achievement and maintenance of maximum nondepleting level of annual or periodic production of the various
renewable resources of land without impairment of the
productivity of the land.
Utah Administrative Code, 1987-1988, R632-2. State Land
Management Objectives
R632-2-2.

Management Objectives

The general management objective for state lands is to
provide for the maximum utilization of the natural resources
consistent with multiple use-sustained yield principles and
proper resource management practices. Coincident with this
general objective, the division and board seek to:
1. obtain the greatest possible monetary return for
the school and institutional trusts consistent with sound
management practices to which such land is assigned.
2. manage school and institutional trust lands for
their highest and best use.
3. perpetuate the renewable natural resources on state
lands using conservation practices.
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Utah Code Annotated S 65-1-14i
The Board of State Lands shall
determine the state policy and advise
the director on the directionf
management and control of state lands
heretofore or hereafter granted to this
state by the United States Government,
or others, and of lands lying below the
water's edge of any lake or stream to
the bed of which the state is entitled,
for any and all purposes whatsoever,
except lands used or set apart for
public purposes or occupied by public
buildings; provided, that the board
shall establish comprehensive land
management policies for state lands
using multiple use-sustained yield
principles, consistent with school trust
responsibilities. . • .
The board, with the approval of the
executive director of natural resources,
and the governor may set apart for
public park or recreational use any part
of the lands claimed by the state as the
beds of lakes or streams and may
delegate the duty and authority to
manage the surface of lands so set apart
to the division of parks and recreation,
the division of wildlife resources or
other appropriate state agency. . . .
For the purposes of this title,
multiple use means the management of
various surface and subsurface resources
so that they are utilised in the
combination that will best meet the
present and future needs of the people
of Utah. Sustained yield means the
achievement and maintenance of highlevel annual or regular periodic output
of the various renewable resources of
land without impairment of the
productivity of the land. In the
development of comprehensive land
management policies, the board shall
consider stewardship management
programs.
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Utah Code Annotated 63-46b-22
(1) The procedures for agency action, agency review,
and judicial review contained in this chapter are applicable to
all agency adjudicative proceedings commenced by or before an
agency on and after January 1, 1988.
(2) Statutes and rules governing agency action, agency
review, and judicial review that are in effect on December 31,
1987, govern all agency adjudicative proceedings commenced by or
before an agency on or before December 31, 1987, even if those
proceedings are still pending before an agency or a court on
January 1, 1988.
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